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I. INTRODUCTION

How might one conceive of African-American history as U.S.
immigration history, and with what implications for our understanding of
immigration itself? The historiography of U.S. immigration has been heavily
invested in producing an idea of immigrants as individuals who move from
"there" to "here," with both "there" and "here" taken to be actually existing
territorial entities. Even a cursory inspection of the titles of vastly different
immigration histories--Oscar Handlin's The Uprooted: The Epic Story of
the Great Migrations that Made the American People, Ronald Takaki's

Strangersfrom a Different Shore: A History ofAsian Americans, and Roger
Daniels' Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in
American Life-testifies to the centrality of spatial movement in historians'
understanding of immigration. Over the years, African-Americans have been
represented differently depending upon the kinds of spatial movement that
immigration historians have elected to valorize
Until recently, African-Americans tended to fare poorly within the
historiography of U.S. immigration because of the weight immigration
historians placed on voluntarism in spatial movement. As it emerged in the
1920s, the "Whiggish" historiography of U.S. immigration celebrated the
figure of the immigrant as an individual who "chose" to move from "there"
(the Old World) to "here" (the New World) in search of freedom, opportu-
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nity, and so on.2 Not surprisingly, this construction of the figure of the
immigrant completely erased the African-American experience from
immigration histories. Although subsequent immigration histories dropped
the awkward "Whiggish" focus on the immigrant's quest for freedom and
opportunity, the emphasis on voluntarism in movement persisted. Most
immigration histories displayed a certain discomfort with representing the
African-American experience as an immigrant experience
Under the pressures of liberal multicultural inclusiveness, there has
been in recent years a concerted scholarly attempt to link African-American
history to U.S. immigration history by underplaying the requirement that an
individual move voluntarily from "there" to "here" in order to qualify as an
immigrant, and by emphasizing the simple fact that African-Americans
moved from "there" (Africa) to "here" (the New World). This fact-the
brute fact of spatial movement-is taken to be the key to representing
African-Americans as bonafide immigrants. Thus, in his general overview
of the history of immigration to the United States, Roger Daniels represents
African-Americans as immigrants by asserting that "the slave trade was one
of the major means of bringing immigrants to the New World in general and
the United States in particular."4 In other words, while contemporary
immigration historians have abandoned the focus on voluntarism in
movement, which is an entirely salutary advance in our understanding of
immigration, they have retained a view of immigration as a spatial
movement from "there" to "here."
It is relatively easy to trace this specific linking of African-American
history to U.S. immigration history to the pressures of liberal multicultural
inclusiveness. Ideologues of liberal multiculturalism have placed immigration-understood as a spatial movement from "there" to "here"--at the heart
of what they view as a robust American multiculturalism. For example, in
a tract entitled What it Means to Be an American, Michael Walzer asserts:
This is not Europe; we are a society of immigrants, and the experience
of leaving a homeland and coming to this new place is an almost

2Idraw this representation of the "Whiggish" historiography ofU.S. immigration from

John J. Bukowczyk, Migrationand Capitalism,36 INT'L LAB. & WORKING CLASS HIST.61
(1989) and Barry Goldberg, Historical Reflections on Transnationalism,Race, and the
American Immigrant Saga, in TOWARDS A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON MIGRATION:
ETHNICrrY AND NATIONALISM RECONSIDERED (Nina Glick Schiller et al. eds., 1992).
3
Thus, although he recognized the significance of the slave trade in peopling the
American colonies, Maldwyn A. Jones questioned "[w]hether or not... [Negroes] were
immigrants in the strict sense." MALDWYN A. JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 27 (2d ed.
1960).4
ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY

IN AMERICAN LIFE 54 (1990).
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universal "American" experience. It should be celebrated. But the

celebration will be inauthentic and hypocritical if we are busy building
walls around our country. Whatever regulation is necessary-we can
argue about that-the flow5 ofpeople, the material base of multiculturalism, should not be cut off.
In this rendering, immigration-described in resolutely voluntaristic terms
as "the experience of leaving a homeland and coming to this new place"--is
viewed as the "material base" of a thriving American multiculturalism.
Immigrants bring distinctive cultural identities with them when they move
from "there" to "here." Not surprisingly, if African-Americans are to
participate on equal terms alongside others in a multicultural order founded
upon immigration, they must also claim-or have claimed for them--"the
experience of leaving a homeland and coming to this new place." This is
something that a focus on the brute fact of African-Americans' movement
from Africa to the New World-their lack of voluntarism in this movement
notwithstanding-can readily accomplish.
The problem with this particular linking of African-American history
to U.S. immigration history is that it simply reproduces the dominant
historiographical view of immigration as a spatial movement of individuals
from "there" to "here." In so doing, it completely misses the highly
significant ways in which African-American history can compel a radical
rethinking of immigration itself. Through an examination of a fragment of
African-American history-the debates surrounding the proper legal
construction of emancipated slaves in the context of poor relief administration in late eighteenth century Massachusetts-this Article attempts just such
a rethinking.
At this juncture, one might well ask why it is at all necessary to rethink
the dominant historiographical view of immigration as the spatial movement
of individuals from "there" to "here." After all, this view of immigration has
a venerable lineage, sits comfortably with celebrations of liberal multiculturalism, and corresponds to our sense of what immigration is "really" all
about. I would argue that such a rethinking is imperative because this view
of immigration fetishizes territory in ways that feed into, and ultimately
enable, pernicious contemporary renderings of the problem of immigration,
the solution to the problem of immigration, and, perhaps most important,
influential legal-theoretical justifications of the solution to the problem of
immigration.6
5

MICHAELWALZER,WHATrrIMEANSTOBEANAMERICAN
6

17 (1992) (emphasis added).
Geographers have of course long been aware of the fetishization of territory in state
practices. ROBERT D. SAcK, HUMAN TERRrTORIALITY: ITS THEORY AND HISTORY (1986).
Unfortunately, their insights have had very little impact on dominant legal-theoretical
approaches to immigration.
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The contemporary American state's construction of both the problem
of immigration and its solution reveals the extent of this fetishization of
territory. Within official discourses and practices, the problem of immigration is that unwanted immigrants come "here;" the solution to the problem
lies in keeping unwanted immigrants "there." Accordingly, the state devotes
a significant portion of its energies to erecting fences to keep potential
immigrants out, to patrolling its territory to weed out immigrants who have
entered without its permission, to restricting resident immigrants' access to
welfare on the theory that others will be discouraged from coming, and so
on.
But the fetishization of territory also underpins influential legaltheoretical approaches to immigration that justify the contemporary
American construction of the problem of immigration and its solution.
Within these approaches, precisely because the immigrant is imagined as
moving spatially from "there" to "here," the immigrant's claims upon the
community-whether these consist of claims to enter and remain within the
territory of the community or claims upon the resources of the community
once within the territory of the community-might safely be deemed
inferior, less deserving of recognition, or more susceptible to rejection.
It is worth exploring how the sense of the immigrant as one who moves
spatially from "there" to "here" translates into the conviction that the
immigrant's claims upon the community are susceptible to rejection. For the
most part, we are not dealing here with explicit, crude, or vulgar nationalist
arguments that might be dismissed out of hand. Rather, essential to this act
of translation is the sense that the immigrant comes "here" as one who is
already a member of an actually existing, legally recognized, territorial
community. Unlike members of the community "here" who have no other
community in which to turn, immigrants can always go "there" if refused
admission "here;" always draw upon resources "there" if denied claims upon
resources "here;" and always participate "there" if barred from participating
"here." The possibilities assumed to be available to the immigrant
"there"--typically, the country from which the immigrant comes-permit,
sanction, and otherwise enable us to mark the immigrant's claims "here" as
inferior to the claims of citizens.
Of course, given the vast resource differences that exist among the
various countries in the contemporary world, any sense of comfort that we
derive from knowing that immigrants can always levy claims upon their
countries of origin is suspect. Nevertheless, this sense of comfort continues
quite persistently to animate both the constitutional law of immigration and
influential theoretical approaches to immigration. It rests upon some sense
of the formal, legal equivalence of territorial states. In a world carved up into
actually existing, mutually exclusive, and legally equivalent territorial
states-a world in which memberships and places are represented by
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passports, all of which look alike, even if the memberships and places they
represent do not-it remains possible to refuse the immigrant's claims upon
the community on the ground that every immigrant carries some passport
that represents some country, a real place where the immigrant can levy his
claims, even if everyone knows that those claims are likely to be frustrated
there.
The idea that immigrants' claims upon the community might be refused
at will on the ground that immigrants are citizens of another country has
always informed the constitutional law of immigration. Within the register
of the "plenary power doctrine" that underpins the constitutional law of
immigration, the refusal of immigrants' claims has often adhered to the
following logic. Precisely because immigrants are citizens of other countries,
in all matters involving immigration, courts may safely transpose the redress
of immigrants' claims from the realm of constitutional law to the realm of
foreign relations. In this latter realm, the countries to which immigrants
belong may be expected to take up immigrants' grievances with the United
States. Accordingly, in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, a late nineteenth
century case widely viewed as having inaugurated the "plenary power
doctrine," the United States Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's constitutional challenge to the first Chinese exclusion laws inter aliaon the ground
that China-the country to which the plaintiffbelonged-could argue on the
plaintiff's behalf in the arena of government-to-government relations.7 Other
examples ofjudicial invocations of the protections that immigrants allegedly
derive from their countries of origin as a basis for denying their claims in
American courts of law could be cited, but are unnecessary for present
purposes.
This constitutional abdication of responsibility for safeguarding
immigrants' claims upon the community finds its analogue in influential
theoretical approaches to immigration that derive comfort from the fact that
immigrants come from some other country in order to justify their representation of immigrants' claims upon the community as inferior. 8 First,

7
Chae ChanPingv. United States, (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,606(1889).
The Court stated:
If the government of the country of which the foreigners excluded are subjects is
dissatisfied with this action it can make complaint to the executive head of our
government, or resort to any other measure which, in its judgment, its interests or
dignity may demand; and there lies its only remedy.

Id.

8
My object here is not to be exhaustive. Of course, there are all sorts of theoretical
positions on the ethics of immigration restriction, including many that are entirely opposed
to those I mention here. For a range of different positions, see FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL
IssuEs IN THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY (Brian Barry &
Robert E. Goodin eds., 1992).
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proceeding from the view that "[t]he primary good that we distribute to one
another is membership in some human community," Michael Walzer has
famously argued that territorially constituted communities-by which he
means countries-are not morally bound to admit strangers into their
territory because their own associational activities take precedence over
strangers' claims to admittance. However, the fact that Walzer assumes
everyone to possess membership in "some human community" betrays his
conviction that strangers refused admittance have some country to which
they can return. This conviction is then further revealed in Walzer's
recognition that the claims of refugees might be entitled to special consideration precisely because they have no country to which they can return:
"Might not admission, then, be morally imperative, at least for these
strangers, who have no other place to go?" 9 Second, at the opening of her
work on American citizenship, Judith Skhlar asserts that immigrants' claims
for recognition of their historic suffering are less deserving of her attention
than the claims of natives precisely because immigrants come from other
countries: "The history of immigration and naturalization policies is not,
however, my subject. It has its own ups and downs, but it is not the same as
that of the exclusion of native-born Americans from citizenship."' The idea
here is that because immigrants-unlike natives-come from somewhere
else, a real place where they can levy their claims, the claims of natives to
citizenship take precedence over the claims of immigrants to citizenship.
Finally, Peter Schuck argues that immigrants who fail to naturalize reveal a
lack of commitment to American civic life that ultimately robs their welfare
claims of legitimacy. In his view, immigrants' welfare claims are marked as
inferior precisely because immigrants cling to the countries from which they
come." As suggested by these legal-theoretical approaches to immigration,
the understanding of the immigrant as one moving in space from "there" to
"here"-with both "there" and "here" imagined as actually existing
territorial entities-becomes critical to justifying a denial of the immigrant's
claims "here." The fragment of African-American history explored in this
Article seeks to challenge this understanding of the immigrant.
In late eighteenth century Massachusetts, the system of poor relief
administration came closest to regulating what we recognize today as
immigration; it sought to secure territorial communities against the claims
of outsiders. Within this system, just as under contemporary immigration
regimes, individuals were seen as moving in space from "there" to "here."

9

MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY

31, 45 (1983) (emphasis in original).
10

JUD1TH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 4 (1991).

"PETER

H. ScHUCK,

The Devaluation of American Citizenship, in

CIZENS,

STRANGERS AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIzENSHIP 72 (1998).
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"There" and "here" were taken to be actually existing territorial entities,
typically towns. The fact that an individual came from some town community ("there") became critical to how the town community he had entered
("here") would deal with his claims. Legal responsibility for the recognition
of the individual's claims lay with the town community from which he
came; accordingly, an individual's claims could be refused "here" because
they could be made-indeed properly belonged--"there."
As they emerged from slavery in the late eighteenth century, AfricanAmericans threw this entire system into a crisis. While they had been slaves,
African-Americans had been the legal responsibility of their masters. As
subjects of claims, enslaved African-Americans were thus invisible to the
town communities in which they lived and worked. When they emerged
from slavery, however, African-Americans suddenly surfaced as subjects of
claims who came from no place in particular; there was simply no actually
existing territorial entity upon which to pin the legal responsibility for their
support. African-Americans were "here" without having come from "there."
How were the claims of these new subjects to be handled? While racial
ideology had everything to do with how the claims of African-Americans
were handled, this racial ideology acquired significant form through a
strategy, the logic of which was determined within the framework of a
system of poor relief administration that rested upon a view of individuals
moving in space from "there" to "here." In entirely brazen attempts to refuse
legal responsibility for the claims of former slaves, town communities
sought to represent former slaves as "foreigners;" they assigned "foreign"
geographic origins to former slaves. Former slaves thus came to be
represented as coming from territorial entities outside Massachusetts,
typically from a place called "Africa," so that town communities would not
be burdened with the legal responsibility of recognizing their claims.
The problem that African-Americans emerging from slavery posed for
the system of poor relief administration-and the geographic origins that
town communities assigned to former slaves in order to deal with the
problem-exposes the fetishization of territory underlying the dominant
understanding ofimmigration as a process of spatial movement from "there"
to "here." From it, we can draw two important conclusions. First, the fact
that immigrants move in space from "there" to "here"--such that the
problem of immigration and its solution come to be imagined in territorial
terms-might not be the critical fact about immigrants. If the AfricanAmerican experience in late eighteenth century Massachusetts is taken as a
guide, the problem with immigrants is revealed to be not so much the fact
that they simply show up "here," but the fact that they emerge at given
moments as legally visible subjects of claims on what we might think of as
a "landscape of claims." This landscape of claims does not necessarily
correspond to the territory of the community. It corresponds rather to the
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public register within which individuals are legally recognized (and thus
become legally visible) as subjects of claims upon the community. As long
as they were slaves-and thus the legal responsibility of their
masters-African-Americans did not pose a problem to the town communities in which they lived and worked. This was precisely because they were
legally invisible on the landscape of claims. African-Americans became a
problem for town communities-communities they had physically neither
left nor entered-only once they were no longer slaves, no longer the legal
responsibility of their masters, and thus legally visible on the landscape of
claims.
Understanding the problem of immigration as one of managing
immigrants' legal visibility on the landscape of claims-rather than as one
of managing territorial boundaries--draws attention to the role of the state
in constantly making immigrants legally invisible on the landscape of
claims. Understood this way, keeping immigrants outside the territorial
boundaries of the community appears to be only one-albeit an extremely
important one-among various strategies of rendering immigrants legally
invisible as subjects of claims. Other viable strategies include resolutely
maintaining millions of immigrants in a state of "illegality" so that they do
not dare articulate claims upon the community, simply refusing to recognize
"legal" immigrants' claims for welfare, and so on.
Second, and more important, the state's invocation of the immigrant's
coming from an actually existing territorial entity outside the territorial
boundaries of the community as a basis for refusing the immigrant's claims
upon the community is revealed with breathtaking clarity as the pure effect
of a prior desire to refuse the immigrant's claims upon the community.
Although African-Americans had in fact come from slavery, town communities assigned them geographic origins outside Massachusetts-in a place
called "Africa"--with a view to representing them as "foreigners" who were
the legal responsibility of "somewhere else." The object was purely to deny
legal responsibility for former slaves. This assignment of geographic origins
to African-Americans should be read not as underscoring a basic mismatch
between former slaves and the immigrant who "really" comes from
"somewhere else," but rather as underscoring the politics routinely
underlying the construction of the "somewhere else" from which the
immigrant supposedly comes. The point is that the state invokes immigrants'
origins in some place outside the community when-and insofar as-this
invocation serves to justify refusing the immigrant's claims upon the
community. If there is an acceptance that the state invokes the "there" from
which immigrants come to justify its refusal of immigrants' claims-which
is not to deny that immigrants do "in fact" come from outside the territorial
boundaries of the community-there might at least be a revision of
influential theoretical approaches to immigration that uncritically invoke
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immigrants' places of origin as a basis for justifying a refusal of their claims
upon the community.
There have, of course, been some attempts to link African-American
history to immigration history through a focus on the legal construction of
free blacks, most notably in the extremely valuable work of Gerald Neuman.
In his excellent survey of immigration restriction in the early Republic,
Neuman describes (1) the ways in which several antebellum states, both free
and slave, barred the entry of free blacks and (2) the ways in which the slave
states sought to compel free blacks to leave slave territory on pain of12
incurring more or less horrific penalties, including re-enslavement.
However, Neuman operates with precisely the territorially-driven understanding of immigration as a spatial movement from "there" to "here" that
this Article eschews. For his purposes, "a statute regulates immigration if it
seeks to prevent or discourage the movement of aliens across an international border, even if the statute also regulates the movement of citizens, or
movement across interstate borders, and even if the alien's movement is
involuntary.' ' 13 Not surprisingly, Neuman does not seek to advance our
understanding of immigration through an exploration of African-American
history in the way that is attempted here. By contrast, historians who have
written about the free black experience in the antebellum United States have
for the most part focused on themes such as race, the preservation of slavery,
and so on without seeing the free black experience as a particular species of
immigrant experience that might afford a critique of the pernicious
fetishization of territory that underlies the contemporary construction of
immigration. 4
It should be pointed out at this juncture that this Article cannot pretend
to capture the full complexity of the African-American experience of
emancipation in late eighteenth century Massachusetts. Fortunately, it is
possible to refer the reader to Joanne Melish's brilliant intellectual, social,
and cultural history of the "problem of emancipation"--and the corresponding development of racial ideology-in late eighteenth century New
England. Among other things, Melish argues convincingly that, decades
before the full-scale emergence of the colonization movement, the successfully realized desire to rid New England of slavery was accompanied by the
less successfully realized desire to rid New England of those who had

2

Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost CenturyofAmerican ImmigrationLaw (1776-1875),93
COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1865-80 (1993).
'341d. at 1837-38.

1 LEONF. LrIVACK, NORTH OFSLAVERY: THENEGRO INTHE FREE STATES, 1790-1860

(1961); IRA BERLIN, SLAVES Wrr TU MAsTERs: THE FREE NEGRO INTHE ANTEBELLUM
SOUTH (1974).
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formerly been slaves.' 5 White New Englanders were never able to remove
black New Englanders from their midst. However, they were able to enact
their rejection of black New Englanders in all sorts of ways; the attempt to
assimilate emancipated slaves to the legal status of "foreigners" was one
such way.
II. MAKING EMANCIPATED SLAVES FOREIGNERS
A. The Structure of the Late Eighteenth Century
Massachusetts PoorLaws
In late eighteenth century Massachusetts, the immigration regime as we
know it today-an autonomous legal regime in which the state regulates on
the basis of citizenship both (1) individuals' access to, and presence within,
its territory and (2) individuals' claims upon the community's resources-simply did not exist. These associated regulative functions-namely, the management of individuals' spatial rights and claims
upon community resources-were performed through the Massachusetts
poor laws. Although they traced their origins to Elizabethan arrangements
for regulating the poor, the Massachusetts poor laws had developed their
own distinctive logic by the end of the eighteenth century.' 6
The Massachusetts poor laws differed from contemporary immigration
regimes in two critical respects. First, instead of citizenship, the legal
concept of "settlement" or "inhabitancy" determined the individual's rights
of access to, and presence within, territory as well as the individual's claims
upon the community's resources by reason of age, illness, disability, and
poverty. This does not mean that citizenship-understood in terms of the
formal legal distinction between "citizen" and "alien"--was irrelevant.
Citizenship mattered insofar as it marked individuals who lacked it with the
traditional legal disabilities associated with the status of alien. A 1785 "Bill
Declaring and Describing Who are Aliens and Who are Citizens of this
Commonwealth" summarized these traditional legal disabilities as follows:
"[N]o person who is an alien to this Commonwealth, can have or hold any
estate of freehold or inheritance within the same, nor have any voice or vote
in any election or in any public affair, or be capable of holding or exercizing

'5JOANNEPOPEMELISH, DISOWNING SLAVERY: GRADUALEMANCIPATIONAND "RACE"
IN NEW6 ENGLAND, 1780-1860 (1998).

' For an excellent concise treatment of the history of the poor laws in eighteenth
century Massachusetts, see DOUGLAS L. JONES, The Transformationof the Law of Poverty
in Eighteenth-CentutyMassachusetts, in LAW IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS: 1630-1800

(Daniel R. Coquillette ed., 1984).
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any office civil, military or ecclesiastical under the government thereof."17
However, in all matters regarding the individual's fights of access to, and
presence within, territory and the individual's claims upon the community's
resources by reason of age, illness, disability, and poverty, settlement was
the operative legal concept. Second, instead of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, the relevant unit of discrimination was the town; to possess
a settlement was to possess a settlement in a specific town. 8
Taken together, these two features of the Massachusetts poor laws
defined what it meant to be "foreign." Of course, as employed in late
eighteenth century Massachusetts, "foreignness" was a polyvalent word; it
referred then, as it does today, to those who were outsiders within the
register of emerging notions of citizenship, nation, and blood. However, in
all manner of legislative discussions, town documents, and popular
understandings relating to individuals' spatial rights and claims upon
community resources, "foreignness" was understood as a matter of lacking
a settlement in a Massachusetts town. Thus, after the formation of the United
States, citizens from other states-i.e., those inside a community being
imagined in terms of citizenship, nation, and blood-were deemed "foreigners" so long as they lacked a settlement in a Massachusetts town. This notion
of "foreignness" as a status constructed in opposition to the status of
possessing a settlement in Massachusetts survived into the early nineteenth
century. 9 It is in the context of this very specific understanding of "foreignness" that towns would attempt to assimilate emancipated slaves to the legal
status of "foreigners;" the precise implications of being a "foreigner"--which will make clear why towns were driven to seek to assimilate
emancipated slaves to the legal status of "foreigners"--will be discussed
later in this section.
Indispensable to the Massachusetts poor laws' aim of regulating the
spatial rights and claims to assistance of the poor was the sense that
individuals moved in space from "there" to "here," with both "there" and
"here" taken to be actually existing territorial entities, typically towns.

17

MASS. ARCHIVES, SENATE UNPASSED LEG., SC1, Ser. 231, No. 344 (1785).
"SThe dual shift involved in the emergence of an immigration regime that we would
recognize today-the shift from settlement to citizenship, on the one hand, and the shift from
town to state (and, later, nation), on the other hand-lay decades in the future, occurring only
once tensions surrounding the influx of large numbers of European immigrants after 1820
threw the poor law system into crisis. I explore this shift in considerable detail in Kunal M.
Parker, State, Citizenshipand Territory:TheLegal ConstructionofimmigrantsinAntebellum
Massachusetts, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 583 (2001).
9
For example, an 1814 tract on poverty classifies the inmates ofthe Boston almshouse
as those possessing settlements in Boston, those possessing settlements in other Massachu-

setts towns, and "foreigners." ANONYMOus, MIscELLANEous REMARKS ON THE POLICE OF

BOSTON 5 (Boston, Cummings & Hilliard 1814).
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Within the logic of the poor laws, at least theoretically, every individual
possessed a settlement in-or, in the legal parlance of the time, "belonged
to"--a particular town. This meant that he had legally recognized claims to
relief only upon that town's treasury and legally recognized rights of
residence only within the territory of that town. Vis-A-vis other towns, each
town was compelled to recognize the claims and rights of those who
possessed settlements therein. Thus, Town A was legally obliged to tolerate
the presence, and meet the claims to poor relief, of all individuals who
possessed settlements in Town A; Town B could physically transport to
Town A all individuals settled in Town A if they happened to fall into need
in Town B, and could further demand that Town A reimburse it for all
expenses it had incurred with respect to such individuals. Thus, the claims
and rights of the individual "here" (the town where such individual
happened to be) were routinely shifted onto "there" (the town where such
individual possessed a settlement).
Precisely because towns bore the fiscal burden of supporting all those
who possessed settlements therein, towns very early developed a keen
interest in keeping the settled population-as distinguished from the larger
population that lived, worked, and paid taxes in the town-to a minimum.
From the perspective of the towns, the settlement laws, which spelled out the
means by which outsiders could obtain settlements in towns, furnished the
most important means of preventing outsiders from acquiring a settlement
in a town and thus becoming part of the settled population of the town. If
settlement was made increasingly difficult to acquire as a matter of law,
outsiders would increasingly be unable to acquire settlements in the towns
to which they moved ("here") and would remain the legal responsibility of
the town from which they came ("there"). Accordingly, over the course of
the eighteenth century, towns brought pressure to bear upon the provincial
authorities to make the settlement laws ever more stringent. As a result of
their demands, the settlement laws tightened; outsiders found it harder and
harder to obtain settlements.
Until the very end of the eighteenth century, the settlement laws
consisted of "common law" modes of acquiring a settlement and "statutory"
modes of acquiring a settlement. For roughly the first three quarters of the
eighteenth century, these modes may be described as follows. Under the
"common law" modes of acquiring a settlement, individuals acquired
settlements on the basis of parentage, marriage, or birth.2" Under the
"statutory" modes of acquiring a settlement, an individual's uncontested

2

For a description of these "common law" modes of obtaining a settlement, see
SuMMARY OF THE LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, RELATIVE TO THE
EMPLOYMENT ANT) REMOVAL OF PAUPERS (Greenfield, John Denio

JONATHAN LEAVITT, A
SETTLEMENT, SUPPORT,

1810).
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presence within the territory of the town constituted a basis for obtaining a
settlement therein.2 The relevant statutes had provided that an individual
who resided within the territory of the town for a requisite period without
being given formal notice to leave,22 or who arrived within the territory of
a town by ship from "beyond sea," automatically acquired a settlement
therein.
In 1767, as a result of the economic crisis of the late 1760s and
undoubtedly under pressure from the larger towns, the Massachusetts
General Court passed a statute that altered both the "common law" and the
"statutory" modes of settlement, thereby tightening the settlement laws
considerably.24 On the "common law" side, the statute removed birth as a
basis of settlement; thus children born within the territory of a particular
town to undesirable outsiders would no longer be the legal responsibility of
that town, but ofthe town in which their parents possessed settlements.2" On
the "statutory" side, the statute removed uncontested presence as a mode of
obtaining settlement; around this point, the General Court also appears to
have jettisoned the principle that individuals arriving within the territory of
a town by ship from "beyond sea" automatically obtained a settlement
therein.26 Thus, after the poor law revisions of 1767, it became practically
impossible for outsiders-at any rate, those who were not incorporated into
the town community through marriage or parentage-to obtain settlements
in towns.
This trend towards tightening the settlement laws continued after the
American Revolution. In response to the economic crisis of the 1780s, the

2

Only persons who were competent to obtain a settlement in their own right-a
category that excluded married women, minors, slaves, and persons lawfully restrained-were able to obtain a settlement this way. Id. at 7.
'The length of the requisite period of uncontested residence was statutorily increased
under pressure from the larger towns. Thus, in the late seventeenth century, it was set at three
months.AnActforRegulatingof Townships, Choiceof Town Officers andSettingForththeir
Power, ch. 28 (1692-1693), reprintedin 1 THE ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE,
OF THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETrS BAY, TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED THE CHARTERS
OF THE PROVINCE 64 (Boston, Wright & Potter 1869-1922) [hereinafter PROVINCE LAWS].

In 1700-1701, it was extended to one year. An Act directing the Admission of Town
Inhabitants,reprintedin 1 PROVINCE LAWS, supraat 451. This statutory structure continued
until the late 1760s.
23An Act in Addition to the Act directingthe Admission of Town Inhabitants,Made and
Pass[e]din the Thirteenth Year of the Reign of King William the Third (1722-1723),
reprintedin 2 PROVINCE LAWS, supra note 22, at 244.
24
An Act in Addition to the SeveralLaws alreadymade relatingto the Removal ofPoor
Persons out of the Towns whereof they are not Inhabitants (1766-1767), reprintedin 4
PROVINCE LAWS, supra note 22, at 911.
'See LEAVrrT, supra note 20, at 21.
261 have been unable to identify when this principle disappeared; there is no doubt,
however, that it was not adhered to in the late eighteenth century.
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General Court completely revised the settlement laws in the 1780s and
1790s; the distinction between "common law" and "statutory" modes of
acquiring a settlement vanished as the entire settlement law was codified.
As instantiated in these post-Revolutionary revisions, settlement remained
extremely hard to obtain. A late nineteenth century commentator described
the 1794 settlement law-the settlement law that would remain in effect
throughout the entire antebellum period-as "hedg[ing] about the acquirement of a settlement with more complexities and difficulties than had
characterized the earlier provincial law. 28 It should be clear by now that the
object behind late eighteenth century efforts to tighten the settlement laws
was to enable the town where the outsider happened to be ("here") to pin
legal responsibility for the outsider's support upon the town in which he
possessed a settlement ("there"). However, this object only made sense in
light of a conviction that individuals moved in space from "there" to "here";
the outsider could be denied the possibility of obtaining a settlement "here"
because he already possessed a settlement "there."
What was to be done with "foreigners"-those individuals from outside
the state who did not already possess a settlement in a Massachusetts town
and who found it difficult to acquire a settlement in a Massachusetts town
under the increasingly stringent settlement laws? Precisely because the
Massachusetts poor laws had no extraterritorial effect, the places from which
"foreigners" came, places outside the state, could not be legally compelled
to bear the costs of supporting such individuals in Massachusetts towns.
Furthermore, in light of the fact that "foreigners" often needed immediate
assistance by reason of illness, injury, and the like, the option of transporting
them to the places from which they came in order to avoid the costs of
supporting them was not a realistic one. In short, the "there" from which
"foreigners" came could not effectively be made responsible for them.
During the colonial period, under a convention of long standing, the
provincial government had borne the expenses of supporting "foreigners";
towns supported "foreigners" when they needed assistance and submitted

"An Act determiningwhat Transactionsshall be necessaryto constitutethe settlement
of a Citizen in any particularTown or District(1789), reprintedin ACTS AND LAWS OFTHE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 408 (Boston, Wright & Potter 1894) [hereinafter
ACTS AND LAWS]; An Act ascertainingwhat shallconstitute a legal Settlement ofany Person,
in any Town orDistrictwithin the Commonwealth, so as to entitle him to support therein in
case he becomes Poor andstands in need of relief-andfor repealingall Lavs heretofore
made respecting
such Settlement (1793), reprintedin ACTS AND LAWS at 439 (1895).
28
JoHN CUMMINGS, POOR-LAWS OF MASSACHUSETrS AND NEW YORK 34-36 (New
York, Macmillan 1895).
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accounts for reimbursement to the provincial authorities.29 After the
American Revolution, this convention was formalized. Following the poor
law revisions of the early 1790s, town poor relief officials were legally
obliged to "relieve and support, and in case of their decease, decently bury
all poor persons residing or found in their towns or districts, having no
lawful settlements within this Commonwealth." The Commonwealth would
reimburse expenses on the basis of accounts regularly submitted to, and
inspected by, the General Court's standing Committee on Accounts."
From the perspective of town poor relief officials, the logic underlying
the Commonwealth's assumption of legal responsibility for the support of
"foreigners" might be set forth as follows. The Commonwealth assumed the
legal responsibility for the support of the "foreigner" because it was "unjust"
to place this responsibility upon any single town. However, in assuming this
legal responsibility, the Commonwealth also actually stood in for-and thus
essentially represented the "there" from which the "foreigner" came. From
the perspective of town poor relief officials, to mark an individual as the
legal responsibility of the Commonwealth was generally to mark him as an
individual coming from some place outside the state. Correspondingly, to
mark an individual as coming from some place outside the state was
generally to mark him as the legal responsibility of the Commonwealth.
What did it mean to be a "foreigner" in late eighteenth century
Massachusetts? As an initial matter, the fact that "foreigners" lacked a
settlement in a specific Massachusetts town meant that they had neither
stable claims to poor relief nor stable rights to residence. As such, they could
be-and in practice were-driven from town to town. The hardships
associated with lacking a settlement are apparent in the rare accounts that
"foreigners" offered of themselves. For example, in January 1787, Hannah
Rutherford petitioned the General Court for support in the following terms:
The petition of Hannah Henly Alias Rutherford humbly sheweth, that
your Petitioner was a Native of Ireland, & at about fourteen years of age
was Stolen from my Parents & Brought over Into this Country & Sold for
29
By common consensus of historians, the origin of the provincial government's
assumption of responsibility for individuals without settlement is traced to the outbreak of
King Philip's War in 1675, which produced a wave of refugees who fled their homes for more
secure communities. In order to deter towns from driving these refugees away, the General
Court ordered towns to administer to the needs of the refugees, assuring them that the
refugees would be supplied "out of the publick Treasury." THE CoLoNIAL LAws OF
MAssAcHUsETrs 283 (William H. Whitmore ed., Boston, Rockwell & Churchill 1887)
(1672), microformedonLibrary ofAmerican Civilization 14744 (Chicago, LibraryResources
1970).
3
AnActprovidingforthereliefandsupport,employment andremovalofthePoor,and
for repealingallformerlaws madefor those purposes (1793), reprintedin AcTs AND LAws,
supranote 27, at 439 (1895).
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a Servant to One Mr. Buckingham ofRutland (for four years). Soon after
I was sold to one Mr. Reed of Leicester, with whom I lived About a
fortnight Before he sold me to Mr. William Scott of Palmer with whom
I Lived almost two years when he sold me to Mr. Patrick Smith of Sd
Palmer, with whom I served the Rest of the four years-after which time
I Sojourned Whethersoever I could find a Place. Sometimes in one Town
& Sometimes In another & Laboured for my Support about two years &
then I was Married to one John Rutherford at Brimfield a Transient
Parson [sic] with whom I lived but a Little while before he Died & Left
your Petitioner a Sorrowfull Widow with Little or Nothing to Support
herself with, which obliged your Petitioner to go about from town to
town & Labour for her Support where any body would Set her to work,
& in this way was Able to Get a Comfortable living Until about Seven
years ago when I was taken with the Palsies & Quite Disanabled [sic] me
from work, but being able to walk I have gone from house to house &
lived on the Charity of the Good People ever since who have been very
kind to me. I am now Sixty Years of Age & unable to walk about as I
have done, & Not a Friend In the World to help me.
Although she had lived in Massachusetts for over forty years, Rutherford
lacked a settlement in a Massachusetts town; she had spent most of her adult
life wandering from town to town; no longer able to work, she could not
count on the fact of being able to stay within-and be supported by-any
given town community.3
Furthermore, although the Commonwealth explicitly assumed legal
responsibility for the support of "foreigners," it made it quite clear that its
responsibility was to be temporary; "foreign paupers" were to be sent back
to the places from which they came. Accordingly, the Commonwealth
authorized town poor relief officials to initiate removal proceedings with
respect to "foreign paupers" after their immediate needs had been met.
However, the difficulties associated with removing "foreign paupers"-particularly if they came from places "beyond sea"-were recognized in the very text of the law that authorized removals:
And upon complaint of such Overseers [of the Poor], any Justice of the
Peace in their county, may . . . cause such pauper to be sent and
conveyed by land or water, to any other State, or to any place beyond sea,
where he belongs, if the Justice things [sic] proper, if he may be
conveniently removed, at the expence of the Commonwealth; but if he

3

MMASS. ARCHIvES, HOUSE UNPASSED LEG., SC1, Ser. 230, No. 2420 (1787).
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in
cannotbe so removed, he may be sent to andrelieved,and employed
32
the house of correction,or work-house, at the public expence.

Given this explicit legal recognition of the fact that the removal of "foreign
paupers" might be onerous-and the Commonwealth's explicit assurance to
the towns that it would support "foreign paupers" if they could not be
conveniently removed-there was little reason for town poor relief officials
to go to the trouble of removing them. What little evidence of removals
survives for the late eighteenth century points to a sporadic removal of
"foreigners" who came from neighboring states or the British colonies to the
north.3 In other words, albeit legally removable at all times, "foreign
paupers" were in practice not removed; they were suspended instead in the
precarious legal state of residing in Massachusetts without "belonging"
anywhere in Massachusetts.
B. Emancipation,Poverty, and the Constructionof Black Foreignness
In eighteenth century Massachusetts, all free individuals-whether
Massachusetts natives or "foreigners"--were legally visible subjects on the
landscape of claims. As such, they were legally recognized as being capable
of articulating claims upon the community. The settlement law served the
function of indicating which governmental body was responsible for the
claims of these legally visible subjects. Town poor relief officials' constant
anxieties about ensuring that as few outsiders as possible obtained settlements in their towns-which drove them to push for increasingly stringent
settlement laws throughout the eighteenth century-were all directed at
minimizing the claims of legally visible subjects.
By contrast, slaves were legally invisible subjects on the landscape of
claims. This invisibility was an aspect of the "social death" of slavery, which
has been famously characterized as the slave's utter lack of legally
recognized relationships outside of the relationship with the master.34 Slaves'
inability to have legally recognized relationships outside oftheir relationship
with their masters meant that they could not articulate claims upon the
landscape of claims in their own right. Thus, slaves were legally incapable
of acquiring settlements on their own; their claims for assistance-whether
32

AnActprovidingforthereliefandsupport,employment andremovalofthePoor,and
for repealingallformerlaws madefor thosepurposes (1793), reprintedin ACTS AND LAwS,
supra note 27, at 439 (1895) (emphasis added).
33MASS. ARcHIvEs, HOUSE UNPASSED LEG., SC1,

Ser. 230, No. 3316 (1790)

(containing accounts of Boston which include charges for paying passage ofpaupers to New
New York, Nova Scotia, and Rhode Island).
Hampshire,
34
ORL.ANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SociAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

(1982).
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by reason of age, illness, disability, and so on-were to be directed only
towards their masters; their rights of residence depended only upon those of
their masters. They were to be the responsibility only of their masters.
However, what was to be done with a slave whose master was truly
unable to support him? The needs of an old, sick, or disabled slave whose
master could support him no longer were irreducible; they could not be
wished away. Only for purposes of responding to this very limited situation,
slaves were assigned settlements. The rule was that slaves derived settlements from their masters; slaves' settlements changed as they were sold to
different masters. When masters died intestate, slaves became the property
of, and hence acquired the settlement of,the administrators of their masters'
estates.35 However, there was no question that the slave's claims upon a
town based upon a settlement were to be made only as a matter of last resort,
i.e., when the master could quite literally no longer keep the slave's claims
invisible from the town community. Precisely because of slaves' general
legal invisibility on the landscape of claims, from the perspective of town
poor relief officials, the presence of slaves within the town was not an
especially grave problem.
Under Massachusetts law, the slave's legal invisibility on the landscape
of claims was supposed to attach to him even as he crossed the threshold
from slavery to freedom. Former masters-rather than towns-were to bear
the charges of supporting manumitted slaves. The ostensible object was to
prevent masters from shirking their legal obligations towards their slaves by
manumitting them when they became old, sick, or disabled. Accordingly,
since 1703, on the ground that "great charge and inconveniences have arisen
to divers towns and places, by the releasing and setting at liberty molato and
negro slaves," Massachusetts had required slave-owners to provide town
officials with a security in the amount of fifty pounds for each slave
manumitted to save towns from charges associated with supporting
manumitted slaves. In the event slave-owners failed to provide such security,
the 1703 manumission act stated:
And no Molato or Negro hereafter manumitted, shall be deemed or
accounted free, for whom Security shall not be given, as aforesaid, but
shall be the proper Charge of their respective Masters or Mistresses, in
case they stand in need of Relief and Support, notwithstanding any
Manumission or Instrument of Freedom to them made or given; and shall

35

See LEAVr-r, supra note 20, at 5.
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also be liable
at all times to be put forth to Service by the Select-men of
36
the Town.
There is substantial evidence of a consciousness of, and compliance with,
this law throughout the eighteenth century. Lorenzo Greene cites various
instances of early eighteenth century slave-owners posting security with
towns when they manumitted their slaves.37 In a 1737 dispute over the
manumission of a black man named James, the General Court ordered that
James be absolutely manumitted provided "security be given . . . to

indemnify the town of Boston from any charge that may arise from the
Petitioner's freedom. '38 Finally, in 1760, Jonathan Sewall, one of John
Adams' correspondents, asked Adams for his legal interpretation ofthe 1703
manumission act as it applied the following hypothetical situation:
A man, by will, gives his negro his liberty, and leaves him a legacy. The
executor consents that the negro shall be free, but refuseth to give bond
to the selectmen to indemnify the town against any charge for his
support, in case he should become poor, (without which, by the province
law, he is not manumitted,) or to pay him the legacy.
Adams' interpretation of the act differed from that ofhis correspondent only
insofar as he did not see it as absolutely determining the question of the
manumitted slave's freedom; in his view, "the province law seems to have
been made only to oblige the master to maintain his manumitted slave. 39
What was beyond dispute was that the 1703 manumission act was to
maintain the manumitted slave in a condition of legal invisibility on the
landscape of claims.
As might be expected, throughout the eighteenth century, there were
attempts to subvert the legal regime that maintained slaves' legal invisibility
on the landscape of claims. Slave-owners who wished to avoid the costs of
supporting their aged slaves-and who were therefore unwilling to post the
security required under the 1703 manumission act-hit upon the expedient
of "selling" their slaves to indigent individuals. When such "purchasers"
3

An ActRelating to Molato andNegro Slaves (1703), reprintedin 1 PROVINCE LAWS,

supra note 22, at 519. There is no suggestion here that this kind of act was in any way unique
to Massachusetts; similar provisions were to be found in the other colonies. Benjamin J.
Klebaner, AmericanManumissionLawsandthe ResponsibilityforSupportingSlaves,63 VA.
MAG. HIST. &BIOG. 443 (1955).
37
LORENZO J. GREENE, THE NEGRO IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND: 1620-1776, at 292
(1942).3
-HEL.ENT.CATrERAU., 4 JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE
NEGRO
478 (1936).
39
GEORGE H. MOORE, NoTEs ON THE HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN MAsSACHUSETTS 53-54

(New York, Negro Universities Press 1866).
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proved unable to support "their" slaves, as was no doubt expected to happen
by all parties to the transaction, the costs of supporting the slaves were
effectively shifted onto towns. A 1766 petition from the town of Uxbridge
reveals quite clearly the existence of this practice:
Humbly shews to your Exelency [sic] and Honours that ther is Living in
said Town an old Negro man Named Will and an old Negro woman
Named Subbinah who were of Late till about foure [sic] years ago
servants to ye Reverend Mr. Nathan Webb of said Uxbridge and about
that time he sold said Negros to Daniel Holbrook who after wards [sic]
sold them to John Alden who then Belongd [sic] to Medway and so it is
that ye said Alden is [worth] Nothing and is unable to support his uen
family and is Gon [sic] of late into parts unknown to us and ye said
Daniel Holbrook is since Dead and his Estate is Rendered Insolvant [sic]
and ye said Negros are very old and infirmed [sic] and unable to support
themselves and have no Master to take any care of them and have bene
[sic] in a suffering condition for a long time and ye said town of
Uxbridge hae Ben [sic] at Grate [sic] Expence in ye Necesary [sic]
support of ye said Negros.
The legislative committee to which this petition was referred recognized
immediately that Will and Subbinah, the slaves in question, "have been by
Mr. Webb sold in such maner [sic] as to subject [Uxbridge] to considerable
charge." Because the committee had uncovered similar instances of fraud,
it reported a bill that would have made all financially sound vendors of
slaves-going up the chain of successive sales-liable for slaves that
became chargeable to towns. This bill, however, was never enacted into
law.4" What is important about such attempts to subvert the law, however,
is precisely that they were attempts to subvert the law. By representing a
departure from legally recognized practices, they confirmed the basic
tendency of the law to direct slaves' claims for assistance towards their
masters, and therefore to maintain slaves' legal invisibility on the landscape
of claims.4
40

MASs. ARcHIVEs, MASS. ARCHIVES COLLECTION: DOMESTIC RELATIONS, at 448-50

(Vol. IX,
1643-1774).
41

It is hard to imagine that slaves were maintained in a condition of perfect legal
invisibility on the landscape of claims as they crossed the threshold from slavery to freedom
during the entire period prior to the abolition of slavery in the early 1780s, particularly given
the size of the free black population in colonial Massachusetts, which has been estimated at
forty percent of the total black population in 1764. WILLIAM D. PIERSEN, BLACK YANKEES:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AFRo-AMERICAN SUBCULTURE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY NEW
ENGLAND 22 (1988). However, if indeed there were problems associated with the appearance
of blacks upon the landscape of claims during the colonial period-and I am convinced that
there must have been some-these problems did not inform the debates surrounding the
emergence of blacks as legally visible subjects of claims after the abolition of slavery. As a
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The abolition of slavery in Massachusetts brought the slave's legal
invisibility on the landscape of claims to an end. However, in order to
appreciate the complexities underlying the destruction of slaves' legal
invisibility, it is essential to possess some idea of the specificities of the
abolition process in Massachusetts. Within the historiography of the late
eighteenth century northern abolition of slavery, it is well established that
abolition brought about the end of slavery without making any provision for
the incorporation of former slaves into northern societies.42 Not surprisingly,
abolition engendered considerable ambiguities, uncertainties, and confusions
about the future legal position of emancipated slaves. These ambiguities,
uncertainties, and confusions were perhaps most acute in Massachusetts. In
contrast to all the other northern states with significant slave populations,
Massachusetts accomplished abolition not through a contentious political
debate that weighed different interests and demarcated different responsibilities, but through grandiose-and highly cryptic-judicial pronouncements.
In 1783, in the celebrated Walker-Jennison Cases, Chief Justice William
Cushing of the Supreme Judicial Court declared tout court that, "without
resorting to implication in constructing the [Massachusetts Constitution of
1780], slavery is... as effectively abolished as it can be by the granting of3
rights and privileges wholly incompatible and repugnant to its existence.'1
There was absolutely no guidance as to how former slaves were to make the
transition to becoming members of the community.

general matter, much more research needs to be done on the experience of blacks with
systems of poor relief administration in colonial New England. Scholars have begun this
work only recently. See, e.g., Ruth Wallis Hemdon, Servants of the Community: Black and
Indian Children as Bound Laborers in Eighteenth-Century New England (paper presented at
the American
Historical Association Meeting, Chicago, IL, Jan. 9, 2000).
42
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHrrE OVER BLACK: AMERIcAN ATrrrUDEs TOWARD THE
NEGRO,
1550-1812, at 352-53 (1968).
43
John D. Cushing, The Cushing CourtandtheAbolitionof Slavery in Massachusetts:
More Notes on the "Quok Walker Case," 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 130 (1961), quoted in
ARTHUR ZILVERSMrr, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLIIoN OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH
114 (1967). Except for Massachusetts, all of the northern states with significant slave
populations-Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island-achieved a formal political resolution of the problem of slavery by enactingpost-nati
statutes that effected some kind of calibration between the rights and responsibilities of slaveowners with respectto their slaves, on the one hand, and the public interest in ending slavery,
on the other hand. Although these post-nati statutes undoubtedly engendered their own
problems, they at least represented a systematic, centralized and localizable political attempt
to work out the difficulties associated with emancipating slaves. In Vermont, slavery was
outlawed by the state's 1777 Constitution. In New Hampshire, the process of abolition was
more ambiguous; although slavery appears to have been abolished through judicial
interpretation of the 1783 Constitution, in 1792, there were still 150 slaves in the state;
slavery was explicitly banned in the state by an act passed in 1857. Id.at 116-17.
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The Walker-Jennison Caseswere not hailed at the time as revolutionary
decisions. They went entirely unnoticed in contemporary newspapers, and
slaves continued to be advertised for sale or as runaways in newspapers after
the date of the decisions. However, the Walker-Jennison Cases-when
combined with similar cases brought around the same time-had a catalytic
effect over the course of the 1780s; they convinced slaves that courts were
unlikely to respect the claims of their masters; they thus encouraged slaves
to sue for their freedom or simply to abscond. Under repeated assaults, the
institution of slavery crumbled; when the first federal census was taken in
1790, Massachusetts reported that it had no slaves at all."
As the legality of slavery itself was increasingly cast into question,
slave-owners argued that they should be released from all legal responsibility for supporting slaves. Anything less-particularly in light of the strong
consciousness of property rights animating revolutionary ideology-would
constitute an "injustice." None other than Nathaniel Jennison, the slaveowner in the Walker-Jennison Cases, made this point forcefully. In a
memorial protesting the outcome of the Walker-Jennison Cases, Jennison
began by asking the General Court to "explain" the state's Constitution, i.e.,
to overrule the Supreme Judicial Court, but ended on the following note:
But whatever may be the determination of this Honble Court upon the
point in Question, your [Memorialist] prays that ifthe Servant is set free,
the Master may be free too, if there is reason for the one there certainly
is reason for the other, for it is nowhere to be found in Revelation, that
Christians shall be bond men to the Heathen or Negroes-which is really
the unhappy situation of every person that ever own'd a Negro
servant-who is at liberty while the Master by Law is bound to maintain
& support him in Sickness & health altho' he can have no control over
him-Your [Memorialist] entreats your Honors to take the Case into your
wise Consideration & if you shou'd be of opinion that they are Free by
the Constitution, that you would repeal the Law which binds the Master
to support them, & thus give the Master his freedom as well as the
Servant-if your [Memorialist] is bound to support his Ten Negroes

4Id. at 115. Historians have argued endlessly about the meaning and effects of the
Walker-Jennison cases. See generally William O'Brien, S.J., Didthe Jennison CaseOutlaw
Slavery in Massachusetts?,17 WM. &MARY Q. (3D SER.) 219 (1960); John D. Cushing The
Cushing Court and theAbolition of Slavery in Massachusetts: More Notes on the "Quock
Walker Case," 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1961); Robert M. Spector, The Quock Walker
Cases (1781-83)-Slavery,Its Abolition, and Negro Citizenship in EarlyMassachusetts,53
J. NEGRO HIST. 12 (1968); Arthur Zilversmit, Quok Walker, Mumbet, and the Abolition of

Slavery in Massachusetts,25 WM. &MARY Q.(3D SER.) 614 (1968); Elaine MacEacheren,
EmancipationofSlavery in Massachusetts:A Reexamination, 1770-1790,55 J.NEGRO HIST.

289 (1970).
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while they run about living in pleasure & Idleness, he is the most abject
Man that ever existed.a
Jennison's petition spurred the General Court into action. At its very
next session, the General Court sought to repeal the 1703 manumission act
that had required slave-owners to post security with town officials when they
manumitted slaves; however, for unexplained reasons, the 1703 manumission act was not repealed. 46 Notwithstanding this legislative inaction, as the
legal recognition of slavery faded in Massachusetts, slave-owners simply
refused to honor their legal obligations to support their former slaves.47 As
a result of slave-owners' increasingly determined refusal to support their
former slaves, blacks' legal invisibility on the landscape of claims came to
an end. Although they had neither left nor entered the territory of Massachusetts, with the lifting of the veil of slavery, blacks began to emerge-more
or less confusedly-as legally visible subjects of claims.
If slaves had been pushed into legal visibility on the landscape of
claims by their former masters' refusal to support them, as legally visible
subjects, former slaves found themselves trapped within a larger structure
of refusal. No governmental entity-neither the Commonwealth nor the
towns-particularly wanted the legal responsibility of supporting former
slaves in times of necessity. During the 1780s and 1790s, the Commonwealth and the towns squabbled bitterly with each other on the subject of
legal responsibility for former slaves, with each side trying to shift the legal
responsibility onto the other. This was a struggle not about recognizing the
claims of newly emancipated slaves, but about managing those claims of
injured, dying, aged, and infant former slaves that-within the moral
economy of late eighteenth centurypoor relief-could notbe wished away.4"

45

MASS. ARCHIvES, HOUSEUNPASSED LEG., SC1, Ser. 230, No. 956 (1782) (Memorial

of Nathaniel Jennison) (emphasis in original).

46MASS. ARcHIvEs, JOURNAL OFTHE HOUSE OF REP., at 436, 444 (Vol. III, May 1782-

March 1783). The 1703 manumission act remained on the books until 1807. MOORE, supra
note 39,
at 54.
47
0f course, various slave-owners continued to provide their former slaves with
financial assistance, housing, and employment as the former slaves negotiated the precarious
transition from slavery to freedom. However, this was most often done on the basis of the
affective ties developed between master and slave. See, e.g., PIERSEN, supra note 41, at 33;
MEUSH, supra note 15, at 99.
4I am conscious here ofproducing a somewhat reified notion ofthe "Commonwealth"
and the "towns." Undoubtedly, there were differences among the towns and-in a political
system based upon town representation-within the Commonwealth. Although one would
expect the interests of towns in eastern Massachusetts (which had larger black populations)
to differ from the interests of towns in western Massachusetts (which had smaller black
populations), I have been unable to trace such differences with any level of accuracy.
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Town poor relief officials formed the "front line," as it were, for
receiving, processing, and handling the claims of injured, dying, aged, and
infant former slaves. However, unlike the contemporaneous Connecticut and
Rhode Islandpost-natiabolition statutes, both of which had conditioned the
master's ability to manumit healthy adult slaves without subsequent
financial obligation upon the prior approval of town selectmen, the WalkerJennison Cases-bysimply proclaiming the end of slavery-had ignored the
interests of town poor relief officials entirely.49 Not surprisingly, town poor
relief officials were determined to avoid legal responsibility for the claims
of individuals, many of whom had formed part of the lived community of
the town, but about whose emergence as legally visible subjects they had not
been consulted.
From the perspective of town poor relief officials, former slaves most
resembled the "foreigners" who entered the state from the outside and levied
claims upon town communities when they grew old, fell ill, or became
disabled. The obvious distinction between "foreigners" and former
slaves-that the former came from outside the territory of the state, while
the latter had always been present within the town-was completely
irrelevant. What mattered instead was the emergence of both as legally
visible subjects of claims. As subjects of claims, both "foreigners" and
slaves were originally legally invisible on the landscape of
claims---"foreigners" because they were outside the territory of the town
community, slaves because they were the sole responsibility of their masters.
As subjects of claims, both "foreigners" and slaves became legally visible
on the landscape of claims at a defined moment: "foreigners" when they
entered the territory of the town, slaves when they ceased to be the sole
responsibility of their masters. In the opinion of town poor relief officials,
if the Commonwealth accepted the legal responsibility for supporting the
"foreigner" who had entered the town from outside the state, it should do so
equally with respect to the former slave who had entered the town from
slavery.
Accordingly, after 1783, with the express aim of shifting the legal
responsibility for supporting former slaves onto the Commonwealth, in
petition after petition, town poor relief officials argued vociferously that
slaves had never been imagined as members of town communities; that
former slaves should thus not automatically be given legal settlements in
towns; and that former slaves and their descendents should be deemed
"foreigners." It is important to emphasize here that-because the legal
concept of settlement encompassed both claims to support by the town and

49

For a discussion of the Connecticut and Rhode Islandpost-natistatutes,

supra note 15, at 67-73.
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rights of residence in the town, to argue that former slaves should not obtain
settlements was to argue both that they should not have claims to support by
the town and that they should not have rights of residence in the town. In
other words, in addition to refusing to bear the financial burden of supporting former slaves, the towns were ultimately arguing-in stark confirmation
of the intimate connection between the rise of racial ideology and the rise of
freedom for blacks-for the legal authority to cleanse the space of the town
of the very presence of former slaves.
In a political system based upon town representation, the towns' efforts
to refuse legal responsibility for former slaves did not go unheeded. Town
representatives in the General Court pressured that body to legislate on the
subject of legal responsibility for poor blacks so as to shift the burden of
supporting them onto the Commonwealth. Throughout the 1780s, the subject
was never far from legislative consciousness. In early 1783, the House of
Representatives appointed a committee to bring in a bill that would "make
such provision for the support of Negros & Molattos as the Committee may
find most expedient." 0 In 1785, a joint committee of both houses was
appointed to consider "what measures are necessary to be taken relative to
Negroes, who are now within the Commonwealth, or who may hereafter be
brought or come within the same."5 Also, in 1787, a joint committee was
directed to report "a bill or bills upon the subject matter of Negroes in this
Commonwealth at large."52 However, the towns' pressures yielded no
concrete results. The Commonwealth-itself daunted by the prospect of
assuming the legal responsibility for supporting an expanding free black
population-proved somewhat resistant to the towns' pressures. What
followed was a war of shifting positions between the Commonwealth and
the towns.
During the 1780s, the General Court considerably augmented the
confusion surrounding the subject of legal responsibility for the support of
former slaves by sending flatly contradictory signals to the towns. Without
ever making the basis for its decisions explicit, the General Court agreed to
accept legal responsibility for former slaves in some cases, but not in others.
As a result, towns were constantly driven to represent former slaves as
"foreigners" in ways that they hoped would be convincing to the legislature.
50

MASS.ARCHIVES, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REP., at 444, 529, 531, 537 (Vol. III,
May 1782-March 1783); see also MASS. ARCHIVES, JOURNAL OFTHE SEN., at 413 (Vol. I,
May 1782-March
1783).
51
MAss. ARCHIVES, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REP., at 222, 342 (Vol. V, May 1784March 1785); see also MASS. ARCHIVEs, JOURNAL OF THE SEN., at 248, 351 (Vol. V,May
1784-March
1785).
52
MASS. ARCHIVES, JOURNALOFTHEHousEOFREP., at88 (Vol. VIII, May 1787-April
1788); see also MASS. ARCHIVES, JOURNAL OF THE SEN., at 81 (Vol. VIII, May 1787-April
1788).
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Nevertheless, the trend was towards rejecting town petitions calling for the
Commonwealth to support former slaves.
The first town petition calling for the Commonwealth to support a
former slave since Massachusetts started keeping systematic records of its
poor relief disbursements dates to February 1787. Charles Adams had been
born a slave in Roxbury, had been repeatedly sold, and had obtained his
freedom by serving in the Revolutionary War. In June 1786, while "strolling
about the country with his wife and children," Adams had fallen ill in the
town of Walpole. The town had arranged for medical attention to be
provided him; Adams had died a month later. Arguing that Adams "did not
properly belong to any Town in this Commonwealth," the Selectmen of
Walpole petitioned the Commonwealth to be reimbursed for expenses they
had incurred on Adams' behalf. The General Court's standing Committee
on Accounts, which reviewed all town accounts for the support of "foreigners," granted the petition. 3 In other words, the Commonwealth adopted the
view that Adams did not possess a legal settlement in any town in Massachusetts, and thus that he was a "foreigner" for purposes of poor relief.
At least within certain legislative quarters, this position must have been
controversial. Barely a year after signaling a willingness to accept the legal
responsibility for former slaves, the entire General Court, i.e., not just the
Committee on Accounts, focused upon the issue of town requests to shift
legal responsibility for former slaves onto the Commonwealth. At issue were
two petitions from the towns of Westminster and Dorchester. Dated March
20, 1788, the petition from the Selectmen of Westminster is reproduced here
at length because it reveals the utter confusion surrounding the subject of
where former slaves "belonged" for purposes of poor relief.
Ishmael Thomas, a Negro, formerly belonging to [Col.] Benjamin
Symonds of Williamstown, by an Agreement with his Master served
three years, as a Soldier, in the american Army to purchase his Freedom.
After the Expiration of the Term he resided some years at Dorchester &
then removed to this Town with a Wife & Family. He lived in sd
Williamstown when it was incorporated, was in the Army when the
Constitution of this State, which is said to emancipate Slaves and abolish
Slavery, took place. In the former War he was wounded & the Bullet still
remains in his Leg.. . , which together with the Infirmities of age, being
about sixty years old, have rendered him unable to acquire a Support by
Labor, & reduced him & his Family, a Wife and two Children, to such
indigence, that for eighteen Months or more, they have been a Town
Charge. Formerly the law obliged masters to maintain their Negro Slaves
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notwithstanding any Manumission they might obtain. If the Constitution
emancipates Slaves it may also repeal that Law and place the Poor of
every Complexion on the Same Basis. It is supposed that a Slave, being
the property of his Master, cannot gain an Inhabitancy during the period
of his slavery, so as to charge the Town where he resided in Case of
Indigence. And when by Virtue of the Constitution he is said to emerge
from Slavery & take Rank with Citizens & Freemen, he was in the Army
and not resident in the State. And whether Birth or Term of Residence
are necessary to create Inhabitancy, so as to charge the Town with
Maintenance, we have not the means of Information. Since the Constitution which is thought to give a general Reliefe [sic] to Negros was
established, we know of no Act of the general Court providing for their
Support in terms of indigence and Want.
His Time was spent at Williamstown, while capable of Labor, in the
Service of Said Symonds; And we think it an unreasonable Burden on
this Town to be obliged to Support him in Sickness & old age, and it
might be still more expensive to institute an action at Law for Compensation or Relief. The Case being new would be intricate expensive and
lengthy. The Law uncertain, as no legal Provision has been made to
direct the Process & terminate the Suit.
Your petitioners therefore humbly pray that your Honors ... would take
the subject into Consideration and exempt us from the charge of
supporting the said Ishmael & his family, or take such order on the
Matter as may afford us all reasonable Relief.5 4
The contemporaneous petition from the Selectmen of Dorchester was more
explicit in assimilating former slaves to the legal status of "foreigners." On
the subject of the support of Scipio, "a poor Negro Man who was formerly
imported into the Town of Boston from some parts of Africa" and who had
lived as a slave in various towns in the state, the Selectmen of Dorchester
stated bluntly that they presumed "that the sd Negro Man ought to be
provided for in the same Manner as the humane Laws of this Commonwealth direct for the Relief of unfortunate Foreigners when in distress.""5 A
joint committee appointed to look into the issues raised by these two
petitions recommended the preparation of "a Bill to determine by whom
those Negroes who are indigent & unable to support themselves, & who

"MAss.ARCHIVES, SENATEUNPASSEDLEG., SCI, Ser. 23 1,No. 884/2 (1788) (Petition
of Town of Westminster) (emphasis added). The Selectmen of Westminster revealed their
lack of understanding of the settlement law when they wondered whether "Birth or Term of
Residence" were necessary to create settlement; after 1767, neither birth nor residence was
sufficient to give outsiders settlement. See LEAVrIT, supranote 20.
55
MAss. ARCHIVES, SENATE UNPASSED LEG., SCI, Ser. 231, No. 884 (1788) (Petition
of Certain Inhabitants of Dorchester Relative to a Poor Negro in the Town).
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were holden in servitude before the present constitution took place shall be
supported."56 There is no evidence that such a bill was prepared, circulated
and debated. Furthermore, both petitions may have been rejected; the
approved state pauper accounts for the relevant years do not mention
any
57
appropriations for the support of either Ishmael Thomas or Scipio.
Thereafter, until the mid-1790s, as town petitions continued to be
presented, the General Court wrestled every single year with the question of
legal responsibility for the support of former slaves. 8 Increasingly, the
Commonwealth made it known that it was reluctant to accept the legal
responsibility for the support of indigent former slaves. Unfortunately, town
interests managed to defeat all concerted legislative attempts to shift the
legal responsibility for supporting former slaves onto the towns. For
example, in 1792, a bill entitled "An Act respecting the poor among Indians
and Negroes" would have given all former slaves the opportunity to acquire
legal settlements in the towns in which their masters had legal settlements
as of April 19, 1775; all former slaves sixty years old or older as of April 19,
1775 would, however, be made the legal responsibility of their masters. Not
surprisingly, because this solution would have placed the burden entirely on
the towns and former slave-owners, it was never proposed again. 9
More significant for present purposes, the Commonwealth gradually
revealed itself to be unwilling to accept the towns' characterization of
former slaves as "foreigners" on the simple ground that they were former
slaves. In particular, it is possible to infer from town strategies the emergence on the part of the Commonwealth of a sense that a former slave's birth
in Massachusetts vitiated a town's argument to have such a former slave
classified as a "foreigner." Unfortunately, the existing record does not
permit one to specify the precise legal connection imagined to exist between
a former slave's birth in Massachusetts and his settlement in Massachusetts.
It is very likely the case that, because settlement was originally intended to
56

MASs. ARCHIVES, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REP., at 88 (Vol. IX, May 1788-Feb

1789).
" 7However, a certain Scipio appears as a state charge several years later. MASS.
ARCHIVES, MASS. GEN. CT. COMM. ON ACCOUNTS, ACCOUNT ROLL SuBMIssIONS, 1786-

1850, Roll No. 31 (February 26, 1795), Pauper Accounts (Town of Dorchester).
58MASS. ARCHIVES, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REP., at 230 (Vol. X, May 1789-Mar.

1790); MASS. ARCHIVES, JOURNAL OFTHE HOUSE OF REP., at 192 (Vol. XI, May 1790-Mar.
1791); MASS. ARCHIVES, JOURNALOFTHE HOUSE OF REP., at 140 (Vol. XII, May 1791-Mar.
1792); MASS. ARCHIVES, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REP., at 48 (Vol. XIII, May 1792-Mar.
1793).
59
MASS.ARcHIvES, SENATEUNPASSEDLEG., SCI, Ser. 231,No. 1582 (1792) (Rejected
1792-Act for the Support of Negroes). In this regard, it is worth pointing out that, although
the bill encompasses both Indians and Negroes-thereby testifying to a certain racialization
of the construction of the poor-the logic with regard to Native Americans is entirely
different from the logic with regard to African-Americans.
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distribute the existing population among various towns for purposes of poor
relief, there was a sense that at least Massachusetts-bom slaves should have
a settlement somewhere in Massachusetts, although the town of settlement
itself remained to be designated. Of course, the existence of a possible legal
connection between a former slave's birth in Massachusetts and his
settlement in Massachusetts is complicated by the fact that the slave's
settlement traditionally followed that of his master and did not depend in any
instance upon his birthplace.6 ° Nevertheless, the sense of a legal connection
between a former slave's birth in Massachusetts and his settlement in
Massachusetts may be inferred from the fact that town poor relief officials
increasingly began to represent former slaves who were not Massachusettsborn as "foreigners" on the ground that they were from "Africa."
It is worth exploring the logic behind the efforts to pin "Africa" onto
these former slaves. At the outset, and as a general matter, it should be
pointed out that references to slaves' origins in places vaguely referred to as
"Africa," "Guinea," the "Gold Coast," and so on were common in New
England newspaper advertisements throughout the eighteenth century not
only because of the allegedly superior physical attributes of certain kinds of
"African" slaves, but also because the West Indies-where most of these
slaves may "in fact" have come from-were regarded simply as a way
station in the transatlantic trade rather than as a source of origin.6 By the
end of the eighteenth century, references to former slaves' origins in
"Africa" were being circulated in a variety of overlapping, mutually
constitutive, discursive registers that included, but were not restricted to (1)
calls on both sides of the Atlantic to repatriate free blacks to Africa, (2) the
construction of a post-Revolutionary national identity that was imagined as

'Furthermore, if there was a sense that newly emancipated slaves were Massachusetts
citizens and should have settlements in Massachusetts as Massachusettscitizens, it is difficult
to see why birthplace should have mattered in light of the fact that newly emancipated slaves
appear to have been considered-at least by Jeremy Belknap-as Massachusetts citizens in
both the "external" sense (in terms of the distinction between "citizen" and "alien") and the
"internal" sense (in terms of being able to exercise political rights) regardless of birthplace.
See Queries Respecting the Slavery and Emancipation of Negroes in Massachusetts,
Proposedby the Hon. Judge Tucker of Virginia, andAnsweredby the Rev. Dr.Belknap, in
4 COuECTIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY FOR THE YEAR M,DCC,XCV
208 (Ser. HI) (1795). Of course, the very fact that attempts were being made at the same time
to assimilate blacks to the legal status of "foreigners" within the register of settlement law
must undoubtedly have complicated the question ofblacks' citizenship, and cast doubts upon
it. Accordingly, Belknap reports that "[s]ome gentlemen, whom I have consulted, are of
opinion that [blacks] cannot elect, nor be elected, to the offices of government." Id.
61
PIERSEN, supranote 41, at 6-7.
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European and white, and (3) free blacks' own attempts to construct a
62
positive identity for themselves in the face of vicious systemic racism.
However, in the hands of town poor relief officials, the reference to
former slaves' origins in "Africa" had entirely different and quite specific
uses, and it is these uses of "Africa" that are of interest here. Clearly, while
such individuals had been slaves, it had not particularly mattered to town
poor relief officials that they were from "Africa"; their legal invisibility on
the landscape of claims had made the question of their origins entirely
irrelevant. However, once these individuals had emerged as legally visible
subjects-and after the Commonwealth had indicated its unwillingness to
accept legal responsibility for them as former slaves-the fact that they were
from "Africa" came to acquire a certain valence. This valence had to do with
the fact that the Massachusetts poor laws rested upon a sense that individuals
moved in space from "there" to "here," and relied upon the fact of that
spatial movement to determine the locus of legal responsibility for the
support of individuals. If town poor relief officials were to persuade the
Commonwealth that certain former slaves were its legal responsibility as
"foreigners," they had to show that these former slaves-exactly like other
"foreigners" who entered Massachusetts from Great Britain, Ireland, New
York, Virginia, and so on-came from an actually existing territorial entity
outside the state; "Africa" was pressed into service to make this point. Once
former slaves were shown to have come from "Africa," town poor relief
officials could argue that the Commonwealth should bear the burden of
supporting former slaves on the ground that-because "Africa" was "really"
responsible for them-it would be unfair to place the burden of supporting
them on .any single town. Thus, town poor relief officials' invocation of
"Africa" was the pure effect of a prior refusal to accept legal responsibility
for former slaves. Of course, in light of the fact that scholars have estimated
that only about one-third of New England's adult black population was
foreign-born at the time of the American Revolution-a proportion that was
even lower for New England's general black population-one might well
wonder whether town poor relief officials did not pin origins in "Africa"
onto former slaves regardless of birthplace.63
Already, during the late 1780s, towns had begun to deploy the fact that
certain former slaves had come from "Africa" with the aim of shifting legal
responsibility for their support onto the Commonwealth. This deployment
of such former slaves' geographic origins in "Africa" is clearly revealed in
the 1789 petition of the Selectmen of Grafton:
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The Petition of the Select men of the Town of Grafton Humbly Sheweth
that one George Geyer a Negro Man that Obtained his freedom by Going
into the War in the year 1759 where he froze his feet in such a manner
that all his toes came quite off and by Reason of hardship caused
Ulcerous Sores on his Legs by Reason of which the General Court was
Graciously Pleased to give him a Pention of forty shillings a year to
which with his Industry he Maintained himself till about the first of
January 1786 at which time by Reason of Old Age and his former
Lameness became Quite helpless and unable to do anything towards
supporting himself. The Selectmen of the town of Grafton thought it not
Right that any of the human Species should suffer took Pity on him and
have supported him Ever since that time the above said George was a
native ofAftica thereforeyour PetitionersHumbly Conceive that no one
Town Ought to maintainhim more then AnotherthereforeyourPetitioners Humbly Request that the [GeneralCourt] would take it under their
wise considerationandallow the Town of Grafton the sum that they have
Already Expendedfor his support.64
In this rendering, Geyer's years of slavery, military service, and residence
as a free man in Massachusetts were erased and rendered completely
irrelevant with regard to the question of his "belonging" to any particular
town. What mattered from the perspective of legal responsibility for Geyer's
support was the fact that he was "a native of Africa."
The invocation of "Africa" continued in the early 1790s. Increasingly,
town petitions referred to the fact of former slaves' birth in "Africa"; birth
in "Africa" established that the former slaves in question had in fact entered
Massachusetts from the outside. For example, in 1793, the Selectmen of
Franklin petitioned the General Court to reimburse them for the care of a
former slave. It asked that the General Court "would pass such orders as that
the Town of Franklin may not be burdened with the maintenance of this
Pauper who is an African born but that he may be supported at the publick
expense."65 In 1794, the town of Camington petitioned to be reimbursed for
the care of "Zilpah an African born woman [who] was brought to Boston
when she was about 7 years old [and] has since been owned by sundry

'Grafton, Mass., Selectmen: MSD Petitioning Mass. General Courtto Increase Pension
to George Geyer, Ms. Am. 1542 (Boston Public Library, Rare Books and Manuscripts)
(emphasis added). The General Court had earlier granted the town of Grafton £30 as Geyer's
pension. Resolve Granting £30 to the Selectmen of Graftonfor the Subsistenceof George
Gire,a Negro, in Full of his Pensionfor Two Years, reprintedin THE ACTS AND RESOLVES,
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY: To WHICH ARE
PREFIXED THE CHARTERS OF THE PROVINCE, WrrH HISTORICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES,

AND ANAPPENDIX, RESOLVES-1779-1780, ch. 867, at401 (Mar. 25, 1780) (Boston, Wright

&Potter
1869-1922).
65

MASs. ARCHIVES, SENATEUNPASSEDLEG., SCI, Ser. 231, No. 1888 (1793) (Petition
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persons in the Counties of Suffolk Plymouth and Bristol;" town officials
prayed to be relieved "from the burthen which they think ought to be borne
by the Commonwealth."66
The towns' invocations of certain former slaves' birth in "Africa" to
establish their "foreignness" enjoyed a brief success within the legislature.
In early 1793, evidently deluged by town claims for reimbursement, the
Committee on Accounts formally requested directions from the General
Court: "Accounts from Several Towns in the Commonwealth, have been
presented to them for expenses of supporting Indians, Mulattoes &
Negroes-and as your Committee, are in doubt about admitting all Such
Persons who become poor, to be at the charge of the Commonwealth, they
pray the order of [the] Court for this government in all such cases."67 In
March 1793, the committee appointed to respond to the Committee on
Account's concerns developed a draft resolve. According to this resolve,
legal responsibility for the support of former slaves would be divided
between the Commonwealth and the towns. The Commonwealth would
support former slaves born outside Massachusetts; the towns would support
former slaves born in Massachusetts, with the town in which a slave had
been born designated as the town of that slave's settlement. 8 However, the
resolve failed to pass, and the issue remained undecided.6 9
With the failure of this resolve, it was becoming increasingly clear to
town poor relief officials that the General Court was simply unwilling to
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MASS ARCHIvES, HOUSEUNPASSEDLEG., SC1, Ser. 230, No. 3859 (1793) (Memorial
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MASS. ARCHIvES, HOUSE UNPASSED LEG., Sl,Ser. 230, No. 3890 (1793) (Report

of the Committee on the Subject of the State Poor); MASS. ARCHIVEs, HOUSE UNPASSED
LEG., SC, Ser. 230, No. 401,0 (1793) (Draft Resolve). There was also a bill circulated at this
time on the subject of legal responsibility for indigent former slaves. Proceedingsof the
Legislatureof Massachusetts,MASSACHUSETTS SPY, Mar. 21, 1793, at2 (reporting that"Bill
determining Indians, Negroes and Mulattoes, who are objects of charity, to be the poor ofthis
Commonwealth" was read on March 8,1793).
69
1n February 1794, the House of Representatives appointed a committee "to bring in
a Bill for the purpose of providing for support of... poor indians, negroes & mulattoes."
ARCHIvES, JOURNALOFTHE HOUSE OF REP., at 352 (Vol. XIV, May 1793-Feb. 1794).
The committee instead "reported a Resolve for direction to the Committee on Accounts." Id.
at 389. For a text of the resolve, see MASS. ARCHIVES, SENATE UNPASSED LEG., SC1, Ser.
231, No. 1907 (1794) (Resolve respecting Inhabitancy of Negroes).
In January 1795, the House of Representatives appointed another committee "to
consider whether it is necessary to make any further provision for the support of indigent
negroes." MASS. ARCHIVES, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REP., at 196 (Vol. XV, May 1794Mar. 1795). A few days later, "sundry questions from the Committee on Accounts respecting
the accounts for support of negroes" required the appointment of yet another committee. Id.
at 250.
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accept legal responsibility for supporting former slaves, regardless of
whether they were from "Africa." This realization produced another twist in
the struggle over legal responsibility for former slaves. Increasingly, in their
accounts for reimbursement from the Commonwealth, towns began to
suppress the fact that black paupers were former Massachusetts slaves, and
to describe them solely in terms of their race and/or geographic origins in
"Africa." The object of doing so was to blur the distinction between, on the
one hand, indigent former Massachusetts slaves and, on the other hand,
indigent black migrants who had entered the state from the outside. Under
the existing settlement laws, the Commonwealth was legally bound to
reimburse towns for expenses incurred on the relief of all bona fide
"foreigners"--including black "foreigners"--who had entered the state as
migrants, failed to obtain a settlement in one of the towns, and then required
assistance." Therefore, if towns could surreptitiously pass off indigent
former Massachusetts slaves as black migrants into Massachusetts, they
could successfully shift the costs of supporting71them onto the Commonwealth, thus making them defacto "foreigners."
7

The Commonwealth regularly supported black "foreigners." See, e.g., MASS.

ARcHIvEs,

MASS.

GEN. CT. COMM. ON AccouNTs, AccouNT ROLL SuBMIssioNs, 1786-

1850, Roll No. 6 (May 3, 1787), Pauper Accounts (Overseers of the Poor of the Town of
Andover) (describing pauper in question as "a transient Negro fellow Named David who was
taken sick and died in this Town & said to belong to Albany in the State of New York");
MASS. ARcHIvEs, SENATE UNPASSED LEG., SCI, Ser. 231, No. 1890 (1794) (Petition of
Deerfield).
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By representing indigent former Massachusetts slaves as black migrants, quite in
addition to seeking to shift the costs oftheir support onto the Commonwealth, the towns were
effectively assimilating former Massachusetts slaves into an energetically detested group,
namely black migrants in Massachusetts. Black migrants were not welcome in late eighteenth
century Massachusetts. On March 1, 1786, the General Court appointed a joint committee
of both houses "to consider of & report measures necessary to be taken for preventing
Negroes from coming into this Commonwealth from other States." MASS. ARCHIVES,
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REP., at 463 (Vol. VI, May 1785-Mar. 1786); see also MASS.
ARcHIvEs, JOURNALOFTHE SEN., at 365 (Vol. VI, May 1785-Mar. 1786). On April 30, 1787,
the General Court appointed another joint committee to consider the same subject. MASS.
ARcHIvEs, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REP., at 524 (Vol. VII, May 1786-May 1787).
The result ofthese legislative deliberations was the infamous provision stating that "no
person being an African or negroe, other than a subject of the Emperor of Morocco, or a
citizen of some one of the United States; to be evidenced by a certificate from the Secretary
of the State of which he shall be a citizen, shall tarry within this Commonwealth, for a longer
time than two months." An Act for Suppressing and Punishing of Rogues, Vagabonds,
Common Beggars, and Other Idle, Disorderlyand Lewd Persons,reprintedin ACTS AND
LAWs OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS: 1786-1787, ch. XXI, at 682 (Boston,
Wright & Potter 1893). The act further provided that all blacks covered under it could be
ordered to depart from the state, failing which they could be committed to the county house
of correction "there to be kept to hard labour agreeable to the rules and orders of the said
house." Id. Clearly, few black migrants-whether because they were fugitive slaves or
disenfranchised free blacks-could obtain certificates from their states of origin that they
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Of course, the strategy relied heavily on the two interrelated rhetorical
ploys for representing black paupers to the Commonwealth-the simple
invocation of race and the simple invocation of geographic origins in
"Africa," with the former serving as a proxy for the latter. Unlike the
descriptions of white paupers, which tended to consist of fairly elaborate
narratives containing information as to the pauper's name, marital status,
date of arrival in Massachusetts, the various towns lived in and so on (all of
these facts going to show that the pauper had not obtained a settlement in a
Massachusetts town), the descriptions of black paupers tended to be as
sparse as possible, consisting only of designations of racial and/or geographic origins in "Africa." While this thinness of description might be
attributed to the various "gulfs" separating white town poor relief officials
from black paupers-not to mention the fact that blacks very likely actively
resisted town poor relief officials' attempts to compel them to produce
accounts of themselves-it served the very valuable function of simply
preventing the Committee on Accounts from telling the difference between
a former Massachusetts slave and a black migrant.
Beginning in the late 1780s, it was quite common for town accounts for
reimbursement to describe black paupers only in terms of their race and/or
geographic origins in "Africa." The following descriptions of black paupers
' "a black child,"73
' "Phebe a Negro
are typical: "a Black man named James,"72
Woman,''74 "a Negro family five in number Transient persons 14 Days and
Extra trouble, 75 "Negro Charlotte, 76 and so on. 7 Such descriptions went
along with explicit invocations of black paupers' geographic origins in
"Africa." For example, in February 1792, the Town of Medfield asked to be
reimbursed for supporting "Worrick Green (an affrican Born) Being Sick
were citizens thereof. Boston authorities relied upon this provision to order out large numbers
of blacks at a time of anxiety following Gabriel's Rebellion in Virginia. Notice to Blacks,
MASSACHUSETTS
MERCURY, Sept. 16, 1800.
72
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73MASs. ARCHIVEs, MASS. GEN. CT. COMM. ON ACCOUNTS, ACCOUNT ROLL
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and family Consisting of a wife and three small Children.""8 In January
1795, the Town of Barre asked to be reimbursed for supporting "Sara
Simones & Her Child In Sickness, She Being an African & born in that
Countrey and a [transient person] in this State & Commonwealth."7 9 In May
1795, the Town of Westport asked to be reimbursed for supporting "Dinah
White a Native of Africa, and poor.""0 Such descriptions in terms of race and
invocations of "Africa" could be multiplied. All were accompanied by the
standard, entirely formulaic certification that the paupers in question did not
possess a legal settlement in any town in the Commonwealth, that they were
unable to maintain themselves, and that they were therefore the legal
responsibility of the Commonwealth. Precisely because these descriptions
of black paupers were restricted to race and/or geographic origins in
"Africa," making absolutely no mention of their possible history of slavery
in Massachusetts, the distinction between black paupers who were former
Massachusetts slaves and those who were bona fide "foreigners" was
effectively blurred.
In this regard, it is important to emphasize that race operated as a proxy
for geographic origins in "Africa" and served to produce the legal "foreignness" of black paupers every bit as effectively as a direct invocation of their
geographic origins in "Africa." This might be observed by juxtaposing two
different sets of town accounts for reimbursement, the former referring to
black paupers' geographic origins in "Africa" and the latter referring to
black paupers' race as a proxy for their geographic origins in "Africa."
The first example is the Town of Marblehead's accounts of 1792.
Marblehead organized information about those it alleged to be state charges
into a table with information organized under the following columns:
"Names,....
What Time they Were [Received in the Work House]," "Age,"
"When died or discharged," "were Born," "time they were in the [work]
house" and "Blacks or Whites." From the perspective of the Commonwealth-which would be reviewing the table to verify whether the
individuals were in fact "foreigners" and had not acquired a settlement in
Marblehead-the crucial column was obviously the "Were [sic] Born"
column. Information provided under this column indicated that paupers had
originally come from outside Massachusetts and functioned as a short form
of indicating their lack of settlement. In this regard, while white paupers

78MASS. ARCHIVES,
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SUBMISSIONS, 1786-1850, Roll No. 31 (Feb. 26, 1795), Pauper Accounts (Town of Barre).
1°MASS. ARcHIvEs, MASS. GEN. CT. COMM. ON AccouNTs, AccouNT ROLL

SUBMIssIONs, 1786-1850, Roll No. 33 (Feb. 26, 1796), Pauper Accounts (Town of

Westport).

UTAH LAW REVfIEW

[2001: 75

were listed in terms of the foreign countries from which they came--"Jersey," "France," and "Hallifax"-the sole "African," Jack Doliber, was listed
as being born in "Guinea." In other words, by describing Jack Doliber
through an invocation of his birth in a place called "Guinea," Marblehead
was able to erase his possible history of slavery in Massachusetts (he may
or may not have been a former Massachusetts slave), represent him as a
"foreigner," and thus as a state charge. 8'
The second example is the Town of Boston's accounts for the period
from May 31, 1795 to December 1, 1795. Boston also organized information
about those it alleged to be state charges into a table with information
organized under the following columns: "Names," "where Born," duration
of stay in the almshouse, "Price pr Week," "Supplies of Cloathing &c.," and
total amounts. Once again, from the perspective of the Commonwealth, the
"where Born" column was the crucial one because it served to indicate the
pauper's lack of settlement in Massachusetts. However, while white paupers
were listed in terms of the countries or states they came from--"Ireland,"
"Nova Scotia," "England," "Holland," "Scotland," "Germany," "Prussia,"
"New York," "North Carolina," "Virginia," and so on-black paupers were
listed under the "where Born" column as "Negro" or "Molato." In this
bizarre formulation, in response to the question "Where Born?," the black
pauper's answer would be "Negro." "Negro" was the place from which
black paupers came. Marking black paupers as "foreigners" on the ground
that they were black points to the way in which race stood in for place.82
The ever vigilant Committee on Accounts appears to have been acutely
aware that towns were using flattened descriptions of black paupers in terms
of race and/or geographic origins in "Africa" to pass off indigent former
Massachusetts slaves as "foreign paupers." In the early 1790s, the Committee on Accounts began to disallow certain claims for black paupers alleged
to be "foreigners." For example, in January 1792, the Selectmen ofAndover
asked to be reimbursed for supporting three paupers, "Margaret Plunket
Native of Ireland being poor and unable to support her self," "John Dulap
a Native of Ireland being a poor Cripel [sic] and not able to Labour," and
finally "Primus Freeman a native of Ginne [sic] who is not abel [sic] to
Labour." Very likely because Primus Freeman was suspected of being a
former Massachusetts slave, the Committee on Accounts allowed the first
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(Town of Boston).
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two claims, but disallowed the third.83 Similarly, in May 1794, the Selectmen of Gloucester included a charge for "Negro Cornelius wife & children"
in their accounts for reimbursement; the Committee's notation on the
accounts states clearly that the charge for "Negro Cornelius" was to be
disallowed as a "Negro overcharge." ' By the mid-1790s, in what is
obviously an administrative attempt to ferret out all suspicious claims with
respect to black paupers, the accounts of towns that did not specify paupers
by race are quite literally crawling with notations against individual accounts
that mark them as "negroe" accounts.
Unfortunately for the towns, their efforts to refuse legal responsibility
for supporting former slaves eventually failed. Like the question of the
legality of slavery itself, the question of the legal responsibility for
supporting indigent former slaves was ultimately resolved by transposing it
from the realm of the "political" into the realm of the "legal." In 1795, in the
case of Shelburne v. Greenfield, the Supreme Judicial Court declared the
support of former slaves-regardless of their birthplace-to be the legal
responsibility of towns, rather than the Commonwealth. At issue was the
question of the legal settlement of a black family, consisting of a couple,
Romulus and Rosanna, and their four children, then living in the town of
Shelburne. Alleging that the family had become a charge to the town and
that it was legally settled in the town of Greenfield, the Selectmen of
Shelburne had sued Greenfield for reimbursement of expenses incurred on
supporting the family and prayed for an order removing the family to
Greenfield. According to the jury's findings, since 1753, Romulus and
Rosanna had been the slaves of a man legally settled in Greenfield; they had
obtained their freedom in 1776; and they had lived ever since-with a single
MASS. GEN. CT. COMM. ON ACCOUNTS, ACCOUNT ROLL
SUBMISSIONS, 1786-1850, Roll No. 22 (Mar. 9, 1792), Pauper Accounts (Town ofAndover).
84MAss. ARcHIvEs, MASS. GEN. CT. COMM. ON ACCOUNTS, ACCOUNT ROLL
SUBMIssIONS, 1786-1850, Roll No. 30 (Feb. 26, 1795), Pauper Accounts (Town of
Gloucester); see also MASS. ARCHIVES, MASS. GEN. CT. COMM. ON ACCOUNTS, ACCOUNT
ROLL SuBMIssIONs, 1786-1850, Roll No. 31 (Feb. 26, 1795), Pauper Accounts (Town of
83MASS.

Newbury).
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brief interlude-in Shelburne, where they had married and where their
children had been born. 6 Greenfield denied that Romulus and Rosanna
possessed legal settlements therein. Its arguments were as follows:
[T]hat the law of the late province did not rank the Africans with the
white people; they could not, whilst they were the property of others, be
capable of holding property as their own; that their polls were not taxable
as those of white people; they were not liable to train, labour in mending
the highways, or to perform any other civil duty; that they could not be
removed or warned out of a town, by the selectmen, because they were
but the chattel of another; and therefore, that as they were not contemplated in the laws, as persons capable of gaining a settlement, that they
must come within the description of persons, who were found within the
state, without any place of settlement, and were the proper charge of the
commonwealth.
Greenfield was submitting that former slaves should not be deemed to have
obtained settlements by virtue of their uncontested residence in a town while
they were slaves; to hold that a slave could obtain a settlement in a town on
the basis of uncontested residence therein while he was a slave would
amount to holding towns unjustly responsible for failing to contest the
residence of-or in legal parlance, "warn out"--slaves. As stated earlier,
prior to the 1767 revision of the settlement laws, individuals could obtain a
settlement in a town on the basis of uncontested residence within the town.
Unlike ordinary migrants, however, slaves' residence had never been
contested, i.e., they had never been "warned out"-precisely because, as
legally invisible subjects of claims, they were deemed legally incapable of
obtaining a settlement in their own right. Thus, applying Greenfield's
arguments to the facts of the case, Romulus and Rosanna should not be
deemed to have acquired a settlement in Greenfield on the theory that they
had lived in the town as slaves without being "warned out" between 1753
and 1767; instead, emancipation should be the moment of their emergence
as legally visible subjects of claims. They and their children should be
deemed "foreigners"-the legal responsibility of the Commonwealth.
The court's ruling was cryptic. It explicitly refrained from deciding
whether former masters or towns were legally responsible for the support of
emancipated slaves, but it decided that slaves under "principles of common
law" gained a settlement where their masters were settled.8 7 As a result,

6
Shelburne
87

v. Greenfield, Court Files Suffolk, Vol. 1189, No. 159855 (1795).
The Court was undoubtedly referring here to the principle that slaves derived
settlements from their masters; but it was ignoring the fact that this principle had originally
been intended to allow slaves to make claims on the town community only as a matter of last
resort when masters were unable to support their slaves.

No. 1

MAKING BLACKS FOREIGNERS

Romulus and Rosanna were found to possess a legal settlement in Greenfield. Shelburne could recover from Greenfield the expenses of supporting
Romulus, Rosanna, and their children, and the entire family could be
transported out of Shelburne.8 8 In declaring that former slaves were not
"foreigners" to Massachusetts, but that they derived settlements from their
masters, the court absolved the Commonwealth of the responsibility for
supporting former slaves.
In 1796, in the case of Littleton v. Tuttle, the Supreme Judicial Court
supplied the answer to the question it had left open in Shelburne v.
Greenfield, namely that of deciding between former masters and towns in
allocating the legal responsibility for the support of former slaves. On April
9, 1794, a resident of the town of Littleton, William Tuttle, delivered the
following threatening note to the Selectmen of the town:
These are to notify you that I have a Negro man with me by the name of
Jacob alias Cato which is chargable [sic] & unable to support himself
who I suppose to be the proper Charge of said Town, that you immediately provide a place for and remove him, or I shall of necessaty [sic] be
oblidged [sic] to visit you with him. 89
Tuttle acted on his threat. Jacob-who had been six years old when Tuttle
purchased him in 1779-had been retained in Tuttle's service until he had
grown incapacitated in 1794. When the Selectmen failed to respond to his
threatening note, Tuttle simply carried Jacob to the Selectmen and left him
with them. Obviously chagrined, the Selectmen sued Tuttle to recover the
costs of supporting Jacob. At trial, it was proved that Jacob had been born
in Littleton to slaves; that his mother had been the property of a certain
Harwood; and that it was Harwood who had sold Jacob to Tuttle. In
resolving the question of whether Littleton or Tuttle was ultimately
responsible for Jacob, the Supreme Judicial Court came up with the entirely
preposterous theory that Jacob "being born in this country, was born free;
and that [Tuttle] was not chargeable for his support after he was 21 years of
age."9 By fabricating the myth that no individual born in Massachusetts
could be born a slave-a myth directly contradicted by the facts of the very
case before it-the Supreme Judicial Court formally absolved former slaveowners of legal responsibility for the support of their slaves. Taken together,
these two cases-Shelburnev. GreenfieldandLittletonv. Tuttle-essentially
solved the dispute among the Commonwealth, the towns, and former slave-
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owners over the legal responsibility for former slaves by placing the burden
solely upon the towns.9'
At least within legislative quarters, the Shelburne v. Greenfield case
was being closely watched as it wound its way through the legal system. The
Committee on Accounts deliberately refrained from passing on various
accounts claiming reimbursement for the support of former slaves while the
case was pending before the Supreme Judicial Court.92 As soon as the
decision came down, it rejected all such accounts. Not surprisingly, the
towns sought to have the decision overturned. In February 1796, the General

91
The towns did not give up their attempt to compel former slave-owners to assume the
legal responsibility for the support of black paupers. After they had failed in Littleton v.
Tuttle, the towns resorted to a more creative legal theory to shift the legal responsibility for
blacks onto their former masters. In 1736, Massachusetts had passed an act directing all
inhabitants of towns
who shall receive, admit and entertain any Person or Persons not being
Inhabitants of such Towns, either as Inmates, Boarders or Tenants in the House
where such Person dwells, or in any other House of his whatsoever, within this
Province, or under any other Qualifications, for more than the space of twenty
days
to provide town poor relief officials with an "account" of such persons; if town inhabitants
failed in this task, they were to be responsible for all charges arising with respect to persons
received and entertained by them. An Act in FurtherAddition to an Act Directing the
Admission of Town Inhabitants,Made andPassedin the Thirteenth Year of the Reign ofKing
William the Third(1736), reprintedin 2 PROVINCE LAWS, supranote 22, ch. 16, at 835. The
object was clearly to facilitate town poor relief officials' task in identifying "foreigners" and
giving them notices of "warning out" in order to prevent such "foreigners" from obtaining
a settlement on the basis of residence within the town.
Clearly, former slave-owners had not provided town poor relief officials with an
account of slaves they brought into towns; because slaves were deemed incapable of
obtaining a settlement on the basis of residence within the town-and were in any case
legally invisible as subjects of claims-town poor relief officials had little reason to pay
attention to the presence of slaves.
In 1799, the Town of Topsfield sued Thomas Emerson, an inhabitant of the town, for
receiving, admitting, and entertaining one Nancy Porter in his dwelling house in 1765
without providing town poor relief officials with an account of her as required by under the
1736 law; Porter had become chargeable and Topsfield was trying to hold Emerson
responsible for the costs of supporting her. Perkins v. Emerson, Supreme Judicial Court
(Essex County) at 1 (1799). Of course, Nancy Porter-characterized by the town as "an
Inmate or Boarder"-had been a slave. DANE'S ABRIDGEMENT, II, 412-13. By claiming that
Emerson had violated the 1736 law when he had received and entertained Porter without
providing the town with an account of her as required by law, Topsfield was trying to shift
the burden ofsupporting Porter onto her former master. The Supreme Judicial Court held that
Porter had been Emerson's slave from 1765 to 1776; that as such she could not be considered
an inmate or boarder within the meaning of the 1736 law; that as such she could not be
warned out of Topsfield; and, therefore, that "it was to no purpose for [Emerson] to have
given 92
notice in twenty days, as the act required in the case of inmates, &c." Id. at 413.
MASs.ARcmIvEs, SENATEUNPASSEDLEG., SC1, Ser. 231,No. 2272 (1796) (Petition
of Acton).
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Court circulated a bill entitled "An Bill making provision for the Support of
poor negroes & mulattoes."'93 Specifically targeted at the Shelburne v.
Greenfield decision, the bill declared that no blacks who had been slaves
prior to 1767-when it was still possible for ordinary migrants to obtain a
settlement by uncontested residence within the territory of the town-would
be deemed to have acquired a settlement in a town by virtue of residence
therein while a slave. Such former slaves would be "considered as the poor
of the Commonwealth." The question of legal responsibility for those
enslaved-whether by birth, purchase, or otherwise-after 1767 was not
explicitly dealt with. Unfortunately for various towns, this bill did not pass.
With it died all formal attempts to shift legal responsibility for the support
of former slaves onto the Commonwealth on the ground that they were
"foreigners." 94
Not surprisingly, after the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in
Shelburnev. Greenfield,towns became increasingly careful about specifying
in their petitions for reimbursement that the black paupers in question had
never been owned by any of their own inhabitants; they knew that any
admission to that effect would imply that the black pauper possessed a
settlement in the town and bring a summary rejection of the petition.95
Similarly, in the accounts for reimbursement that they routinely submitted
to the Committee on Accounts, town poor relief officials became quite
scrupulous about designating a black pauper's origins in a seemingly "real"
place outside Massachusetts, such as Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Virginia, or the West Indies, rather than in "Guinea" or
"Africa."'96 The idea was to show that all black paupers with respect to whom
93
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to the General Court to get it to support former slaves continued. For example, in 1796,
complaining about the influx of"negros ... who were freed when they were old and worn
out" (this could be a reference either to former Massachusetts slaves or to black migrants into
the state), the Selectmen of Natick prayed the General Court that such individuals "may be
provided for in some other way than the poor of said town of Natick." MASS. ARCHIVES,
HOUSE UNPASSED LEG., SCI, Ser. 230, No. 4405 (1796) (Petition of Selectmen of Natick).
Towns petitioned the General Court to accept the legal responsibility for supporting former
slaves well into the early nineteenth century. See, e.g., MASS. ARCHIVES, SENATE UNPASSED
LEG., SCI, Ser. 231, 1803,3010 (Petition ofDeerfield); MASS.ARCHIVES, HOUSEUNPASSED
LEG., SC1, Ser. 230, 1807, 5966 (Petition of Selectmen of Sheffield).
91MAss. ARCHIVES, SENATE UNPASSED LEG., SCI, Ser. 231, 1796, 2182 (Petition of
the Selectmen
and Overseers of the Poor of Uxbridge).
96
Examples are too numerous to be listed here in their entirety. For some early
instances, see MASS. ARCHIVES, MASS. GEN. CT. COMM. ON AccoUNTs, AccouNT ROLL
SuBMIssIoNs, 1786-1850, Roll No. 34 (June 17, 1796), Pauper Accounts (Town of Lynn,
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reimbursements were being claimed were bonafide migrants into Massachusetts.
In fact, under the pressures of showing that black paupers were bona
fide "foreigners" to the state, towns even began to produce detailed
narratives about black paupers that all went to showing that they came from
outside Massachusetts. By the late 1790s, it is not uncommon to read
accounts of black paupers ranging from those who were born in the West
Indies, followed a career at sea, and entered Boston as sailors9 7 to those who
were either slaves or the descendants of slaves in various New England,
Middle Atlantic or Southern states and came to Massachusetts for a better
life.98
The fact that towns had essentially lost the battle to construct former
slaves as "foreigners" should not by any means imply that they passively
accepted their legal responsibility for former slaves. Beginning in the first
decade of the nineteenth century, the theater of battle shifted to one of bitter
squabbles among towns. Precisely because this phase of the refusal of the
claims of emancipated blacks is less related to the subject of this Article-the attempted legal construction of former slaves as "foreigners"-it
will not be discussed at great length here. Needless to say, in light of the fact
that the Shelburne v. Greenfieldand Littleton v. Tuttle decisions had firmly
linked the former slave's settlement to that of his master (while absolving
the master of all legal responsibility for his former slave), the black pauper's
history of enslavement haunted all disputes regarding blacks' "belonging"
to towns; it simply could not be shaken off.
In 1808, questioning the idea articulated in Littleton v. Tuttle that no
person could be born a slave in Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court
definitively stated the view that slaves derived settlements from their masters
as slaves and that slaves were thus not capable of obtaining settlements in
their own right.99 From this basic principle emerged the usual judicial

Town of Salem); MASS. ARCHIVES, MASS. GEN. CT. COMM. ON AccoUNTs, AccoUNT ROLL
SUBMISSIONS, 1786-1850, Roll No. 37 (June 22, 1797), Pauper Accounts (Town of
Wrentham); MASS. ARCHIvES, MASS. GEN. CT. COMM. ON AccOUNTS, ACcOUNT ROLL
SUBMISSIONS, 1786-1850, Roll No. 39 (June 28, 1798), Pauper Accounts (Town of Lenox).
97
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Kingston); MASS. ARCHIVES, MASS. GEN. CT. COMM. ON ACCOUNTS, ACCOUNT ROLL
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elaborations. Accordingly, in a succession of cases, it was held that slaves
retained their master's settlements after emancipation and could communicate them to their wives only if they got married after they were emancipated;..0 that an individual must be a slave-and not a servant hired for a
term of years-in order to derive a settlement from his master; 1 and that the
children of slaves derived no settlement from their parents if born before
emancipation.0 2
Occasionally, however, the idea articulated in Littleton v. Tuttle that no
person could be born a slave in Massachusetts was revived. The effect was
a surreptitious transfer of legal responsibility for the support of former slaves
from the towns to the Commonwealth. For example, in 1819, the Supreme
Judicial Court was asked to decide the question of the legal settlement of
Lucy Goman. In blatant contradiction of a decade of precedent, the court
resuscitated the fiction that no person could be born a slave in Massachusetts. According to this fiction, notwithstanding the fact that Lucy had been
born to slaves who were owned at the time of her birth by an individual
possessing a legal settlement in Westfield, she was deemed free-born. The
fact of being free-born had important consequences for the question of her
settlement; it meant that she had none. Ruling that Lucy could derive a
settlement neither from her parents (because they were slaves and could not
communicate a settlement to their children), nor from her parents' master
(because she was free-born), nor by reason of birth in Westfield (because
birth had by that time been removed as a basis of settlement), the court ruled
that Lucy "must therefore be filia reipublicae, never having gained a
settlement in any other town in the commonwealth."1 3 Thus, by being
labeled free-born,
Lucy was assimilated to the legal status of a
'foreigner." 1 04
Precisely because the focus of this Article has been on the struggle
around making former slaves "foreigners," very little has been said thus far
of the experiences of emancipated blacks as they emerged as legally visible
subjects upon the landscape of claims. Although a detailed discussion of this
subject is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth mentioning at least
some details to underscore the point that the debate about the legal position
of former slaves was necessarily accompanied by a corresponding, albeit
infinitely more horrific, treatment of former slaves "on the ground." This

'Dighton v. Freetown, 4 Mass. 539, 541 (1808).
'Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, 12 Mass. 400 (1815); Stockbridge v. West
Stockbridge, 13 Mass. 302 (1816); Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, 14 Mass. 257 (1817).
02
Andover v. Canton, 13 Mass. 547, 551 (1816).
03
' Lanesborough v. Westfield, 16 Mass. 74, 74-76 (1819).
"°Thisposition continued to be articulated into the 1850s. See Edgartown v. Tisbury,
64 Mass. 408, 410 (1852).
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treatment accompanied-and no doubt considerably aggravated-the fact
that many blacks crossing the threshold from slavery to freedom found
themselves facing an intense poverty that they had not experienced as
slaves. 105

In the years following emancipation in New England, former slaves
found themselves victims of a plethora of racist devices aimed-literally and
metaphorically-at getting rid of them, and thus at producing New England
as a space cleansed of both slavery and former slaves. In addition to town
officials' constant harassment on charges of "disturbing the public peace,"
"disorderly conduct" and so on, blacks found themselves vulnerable to
having the settlement laws applied discriminatorily against them; they
routinely faced banishments, whippings and confinements in workhouses in
attempts to get them to return to the places where they "belonged." Not
surprisingly, blacks resisted such attempts vigorously, fashioning their
worlds as best they could in the face of hostility, and openly flouting legal
barriers-such
as those of the settlement laws-standing in the way of their
06
plans.
In light of such experiences, it is hardly surprising that former slaves
petitioned °7the General Court for assistance to enable them to return to
"Africa."' Dated January 16, 1798, the following strikingly eloquent
petition requesting assistance to return to "Africa" begins as follows:

"'SeeQueriesRespecting the Slaveiy andEmancipationofNegroes in Massachusetts,
Proposedby the Hon. Judge Tucker of Virginia, andAnsweredby the Rev. Dr.Belknap, in
4 COLLECTIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY FOR THE YEAR M,D CC,XCV
206 (Ser.
III) (1795).
'0 6MELISH, supra note 15, at 122-37, 190-91. Blacks were also discriminated against
in the actual administration of poor relief Scholars have effectively documented that New
England town officials consistently afforded black paupers both inferior treatment and lesser
protections before and after the American Revolution; for example, an examination of Rhode
Island indentures binding out both white and black children between 1750 and 1800 reveals
that white children were consistently provided greater training in literacy skills than black
children, which would in turn enable them to secure an elevated station in life as adults. See,
e.g., Ruth Wallis Herndon, Servants of the Community: Black and Indian Children as Bound
Laborers in Eighteenth-Century New England (paper presented at the American Historical
Association Meeting, Chicago, IL, Jan. 9, 2000); see also Robert E. Cray, Jr., White Welfare
andBlackStrategies: The Dynamics ofRace andPoorreliefin EarlyNew York, 1700-1825,
7 SLAVERY
AND ABOLITION 273 (1986).
7
11 Such petitions predate the founding of the African Colonization
Society in 1816, and
thus the rise of the formal colonization movement as such. The earliest petition in
Massachusetts dates to 1787. On February 11, 1787, the House ofRepresentatives considered
a "petition from a number of African Blacks praying to be enabled to return to their native
country." MASS. ARCHIVEs, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REP., at 381 (Vol. VII, May 1786May 1787). For evidence of other efforts by blacks to return to Africa, see Arthur 0. White,
The Black Leadership Classand Education in Antebellum Boston, 42 J. NEGRO EDUC. 504,
509 (1973).
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Humbly shew the subscribers, that they are descended from African
origin--that they, or their ancestors, were transported from their native
Country, to this land, by force, and under circumstances of ignominy &
degradation-that, tho the laws have relaxed their severity in regard to
their condition, and the subscribers are declared free, yet there still exists
such an invincible distinction of complection, and such a mortifying
inferiority, derived from that distinction and a sense of their degraded and
unhappy station in society, that they are deprived of ambition &
enterprise, their minds are unmanned, their genius shackled, and they are
left destitute of those incitements to industry, exertion and virtue, which
have a silent, but constant & powerful operation in forming individual &
national characters. Tho entitled to Freedom by the benevolent provision
ofthe Constitution of the Commonwealth, it is impossible that the blacks
should have a fair and equal chance with the whites in the midst of whom
they live, for the enjoyment of that Freedom, or the common blessings
oflife. From the earliest childhood they cannot but perceive ten thousand
marks of degradation. They grow up impressed with the habitual
conviction, that they are an inferior, distinct, humbled class of men, who
are to be treated with contempt, & forever excluded from all the rank,
and consideration, and connections, and honours & offices of the
community in which they reside. Their blood is viewed as too mean to
intermingle with that of the Whites. They are treated as a different race
of beings. Tho born here, they are considered by others and cannot
divest themselves of the idea, that they are still strangersin aforeign
land,a land,which, so long as they continue in it, they & their children
are destined to serve, but not enjoy. 108
What is remarkable about this petition is the petitioners' sense of their own
foreignness being produced by whites (not to mention their grasp of the
socially constructed nature of race; they complain that they are treated "as
a different race of beings"). Undoubtedly, town poor relief officials'
attempts to have former slaves legally classified as "foreigners" within the
logic of the settlement laws must have had a great deal to do with this. What
the petitioners failed to mention, however, was that their foreignness in the
eyes of the community-specifically, the focus on the "fact" of their coming
from "Africa"-had everything to do with the fact that they had emerged
from slavery. They had become "strangers in a foreign land" in no small part
because-with the demise of slavery-they had become legally visible
subjects of claims.

"'0 MAss. ARcHivEs, HousE UNPASSED LEG., SCI, Ser. 230, 1798, 4730 (Petition of
Africans to Enable Them to Return to Africa) (emphasis added). Undoubtedly aware of
growing calls to ship Africans back to Africa, the petitioners were careful to ask the General
Court to make provision at the public expense for the transportation only of such blacks "as
may choose to return" to some place in Africa. Id.
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TV. CONCLUSION

By the 1820s, the problem of black "foreigners" in Massachusetts was
represented solely as one of controlling the influx ofblacks from the outside.
In 1822, in a report entitled Free Negroes and Mulattoes, a legislative
committee emphasized "the necessity of checking the increase of a species
of population, which threatens to be both injurious and burthensome."' 0 9 In
this regard, Massachusetts was joining the chorus of free states that were
hostile to the prospect of blacks moving into their territories.
At the same time, the official myth of Massachusetts' unequivocal
commitment to anti-slavery principles had begun to solidify. The report
lauded "respect for hospitality and for the just rights of all classes of men,
in the constant and successful exercise and maintenance of which, the
inhabitants of Massachusetts have been singularly conspicuous"; it narrated
the history of slavery in Massachusetts as a history of unremitting opposition
to slavery."' There was absolutely no mention of the effort just two decades
earlier to classify former Massachusetts slaves as "foreigners" on the basis
of their origins in "Africa."
Of course, in the nineteenth century, the theater of efforts to represent
free blacks as immigrants at the precise moment that they emerged from
slavery shifted to the Upper South. Ira Berlin has masterfully documented
how manumissions created an "illegal" free black class in the Upper South.
As a class living under the constant threat of deportation only because they
were no longer slaves, free blacks in the antebellum South suffered all the
kinds of exploitation enabled by fear-in the areas of labor, access to justice,
and so on-that "illegal" immigrants suffer today."' At the same time, the
African Colonization Society represents a dramatic instance of inventing
geographic origins for blacks as they emerged from slavery. Unlike
Massachusetts town poor relief officials, who contented themselves with
invoking "Africa" to shift legal responsibility for former slaves onto the
Commonwealth, the African Colonization Society literally invented a
territory-the disastrous Liberia experiment, with a history that smacks of
Euro-American imperialism-where free blacks were properly "from" and
to which they would be returned."' While a discussion of the free black
experience in the Upper South as a certain kind of immigrant experience is

9

'° MASSACHusETTs GENERAL COURT, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FREE NEGROES

AND MULATTOES, at 1 (Boston, True & Green 1822).
Id.at 3.

.See
generally BERLIN, supra note 14.
2
The standard text here remains P.J. STAUDENRAUS, THE AFRICAN COLONIzATION
MOVEMENT: 1816-1865 (1961).
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beyond the scope of this Article, even this cursory reference to it points to
the crying need for fresh historical interpretation.
The attempt to read African-American history as U.S. immigration
history in the specific way done in this Article has had two aims, both of
which are related in different ways to the fetishization of territory that
underlies our understanding of immigration. First, as should have become
clear by now, this Article has sought to undermine the dominant contemporary rendering of the problem of immigration, the solution to the problem of
immigration, and influential legal-theoretical justifications of the solution to
the problem of immigration, all of which rest upon a fetishization of
territory. Although blacks themselves had neither entered nor left Massachusetts as they crossed the threshold from slavery to freedom in the 1780s,
freedom brought along with it the imperative of making them "foreigners,"
and thus the justificatory "fact" of their geographic origins in "Africa."
However, the real problem was that of dealing with legally visible subjects
who were beginning to articulate themselves upon the landscape of claims.
This fragment of African-American history suggests that the "problem"
with immigration is not that immigrants come "here," that the solution is not
to keep immigrants "there," and that we cannot responsibly justify this
solution on the ground that immigrants have a "there" to which they can
return. The "problem" is instead one of curtailing immigrants' legal
visibility on the landscape of claims, something the contemporary state
actively does in a variety of ways that include guarding its territory,
removing individuals from its territory on the flimsiest of grounds,
maintaining millions of immigrants suspended in a state of "illegality," and
denying immigrants' welfare rights. Put another way, the state does keep
immigrants out, but keeping immigrants out does not mean that they are
simply kept out of territory.
Of course, the African-American experience in late eighteenth century
Massachusetts underscores the ultimately constructed quality of the
"somewhere else" that the contemporary state routinely pins onto immigrants as a strategy for denying their claims. In this regard, it is important to
emphasize that the African-American experience described here should not
be read as a fundamental mismatch with an "authentic" immigrant experience that can be coherently grounded upon the immigrant's spatial
movement from "there" to "here," but as a model for all immigrant
experiences to the extent that it offers a way of analyzing how, when, and
why a "there" or "somewhere else" comes to be pinned onto immigrants.
Following this analysis, we should be suspicious of all legal-theoretical
justifications for refusing immigrants' claims on the community that adopt
as an opening position, as Michael Walzer does, that every human being
belongs to "some human community." The fact that every human being
belongs to "some human community" too easily leads to the conclusion that
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it is permissible to refuse immigrants' claims "here" because they can take
their claims "there." Whether or not there is an actual "there" there, to be
facetious, is quite irrelevant; what matters is how, when, and why the state
invokes this "there." It is in this sense that the "there" from which immigrants come reveals itself to be constructed.
Second, one might identify a certain ethical imperative in connecting
African-American history to U.S. immigration history by focusing on the
moment of African-Americans' emergence from slavery as the moment of
their becoming immigrants, rather than by representing African-Africans as
immigrants on the ground that they came from "there" to "here," from
Africa to the New World.
It is a tragic fact of American history, and indeed of contemporary
American life, that immigrants have used their difference from AfricanAmericans to become Americans. African-Americans have always served
as the foil through which a certain national identity-whether an explicitly
racist white national identity created through European immigration, or an
ethnicized liberal multicultural identity created through Asian and Latin
American immigration-has been produced. 3
Within the logic of the conventional "Whiggish" historiography of U.S.
immigration developed in the 1920s, the unifying narrative of immigrants'
voluntary spatial movement from "there" to "here" in search of freedom and
opportunity left out the African-American experience on the ground that
African-Americans-unlike all other immigrant groups-had not "chosen"
America. Through the privileging of choice, immigrants became Americans;
they simultaneously distanced themselves from African-Americans. Under
the pressures of liberal multicultural inclusiveness, as stated in the introduction, the contemporary historiography ofU.S. immigration seeks to "correct"
this shortcoming by underplaying the requirement that an individual move
voluntarily from "there" to "here" in search of freedom in order to qualify
as an immigrant, and by emphasizing the simple fact that African-Americans
moved from "there" (Africa) to "here" (the New World). The brute fact of
movement in space-something that African-Americans share with AsianAmericans, European-Americans, and Hispanic-Americans-is deemed
sufficient to render African-Americans immigrants. Thus, it is possible for
immigration historians like Roger Daniels to claim that "the slave trade was
one of the major means of bringing immigrants to the New World in general
14
and the United States in particular."'

" 3See MICHAEL ROGIN, BLACKFACE, WHITE NOISE: JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE
HOLLYWOOD MELTING POT (1996); Toni Morrison, On the Backs of Blacks, reprinted in
ARGUING IMMIGRATION: ARE NEW IMMIGRANTS A WEALTH OF DIVERSITY ...

CRUSHING
BURDEN? 97 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994).
14
1 DANIELS, supra note 4, at 54.
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But this is ultimately a highly problematic enterprise, in no small part
because of the politics of liberal multiculturalism itself. Within the liberal
imagination, multiculturalism is about the celebration of the formally
equivalent positive identities that immigrants allegedly bring with them
when they move from "there" to "here" and that immigrants allegedly want
to protect from the incursions of the state. These positive identities are seen
as offering immigrants a quasi-autonomous cultural-ethical space within
which to realize themselves as authentic subjects, a space with which the
procedural liberal state is told it should not interfere. I would argue that this
rendering of the immigrant experience once again erases the AfricanAmerican experience to the extent that it does not adequately take into
account either (1) the racism of contemporary immigrants towards AfricanAmericans that permits these immigrants to construct the ethnicized
identities that sit so comfortably with liberal multiculturalism or (2) the
fundamental imbrication of African-American identity with a historically
racist state." 5 The latter observation is particularly important. There is a real
danger to the liberal multiculturalist impulse to separate identities from the
state insofar as it can easily slip into a denial of African-Americans' very
real claims upon the state as African-Americans. The concerted attack on
affirmative action at universities across the country might be taken as a sign
ofhow the liberal multiculturalist impulse has established itself in ways that
adversely affect African-Americans.
By contrast, if the narrative of immigration is rethought in the way
suggested here, i.e., immigrant identities are not so much about choosing to
move from "there" to "here," nor even about the brute fact of moving from
"there" to "here," but about always being produced "here" in order to refuse
individuals' claims upon the community, African-Americans might be seen
not just as being connected to other immigrant experiences, but as offering
the model for understanding the immigrant experience itself. All groups,
whether European-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Asian-Americans, or
African-Americans, are made immigrants "here," not least when the state
pins a "there" onto them as a strategy for managing their claims upon the
community.' 6 Of course, it goes without saying that such a rethinking of the
narrative of immigration in terms ofsharedsubordinationdoes not preclude

"'Occasionally, ideologues of liberal multiculturalismthemselves have acknowledged
that the attempt to ethnicize black identities might not work because of an "ethnic-American
racism." MICHAEL WALZER, WHAT IT MEANs To BE AN AMERICAN 44-45 n.30 (1992).

"'In this Article, I have focused principally on state practices that pin a "there" onto
immigrants without dealing explicitly with the complicated question of how such state
practices have effectivelyproduced nationalist ideologies. For attempts to show how state
practices and nationalist ideologies have historically fed off each other, see Ali Behdad,
Nationalism andImmigration to the UnitedStates, 6 DIAsPoRA: A JoURNAL OF TRANSNATIONALSTuDiES 155 (1997).
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a simultaneous sensitivity to the hierarchies through which that subordination is instantiated.

